Behavioral Economics Goes to Court: The Fundamental Flaws in the Behavioral Law & Economics Arguments Against No-Surcharge Laws by Zywicki, Todd J. et al.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 82 
Issue 3 Summer 2017 - Symposium Article 13 
Summer 2017 
Behavioral Economics Goes to Court: The Fundamental Flaws in 
the Behavioral Law & Economics Arguments Against No-
Surcharge Laws 
Todd J. Zywicki 
Geoffrey A. Manne 
Kristian Stout 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne, and Kristian Stout, Behavioral Economics Goes to Court: The 
Fundamental Flaws in the Behavioral Law & Economics Arguments Against No-Surcharge Laws, 82 MO. L. 
REV. (2017) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 Behavioral Economics Goes to Court 
The Fundamental Flaws in the Behavioral 
Law & Economics Arguments Against No-
Surcharge Laws 
Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout 
ABSTRACT 
During the past decade, academics – predominantly scholars of behav-
ioral law and economics – have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of 
behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, 
most significantly consumer credit regulation.  Over the same period, these 
ideas have also gained traction with policymakers, resulting in a variety of 
legislative efforts, such as the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.  Most recently, the efforts of behavioral law and economics scholars 
have been directed toward challenging a number of state laws that regulate 
retailers’ use of surcharge fees for consumer credit card payments.  In part as 
a result of these efforts, the issue has come before multiple courts with varying 
outcomes. 
The issue reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Ex-
pressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman for the October 2016 term.  The case, 
which centers on a decades-old New York state law that prohibits merchants 
from imposing surcharge fees for credit card purchases, represents the first 
major effort to ground constitutional law (here, First Amendment law) in the 
claims of behavioral economics. 
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In this article, we examine the merits of that effort.  Claims about the real-
world application of behavioral economic theories should not be uncritically 
accepted, and this is especially true when such claims are advanced to chal-
lenge a state’s commercial regulation on constitutional grounds.  And courts 
should be particularly careful before relying on such claims where the availa-
ble evidence fails to support them. 
In this case, the underlying theories are so poorly developed that they 
have actually been employed elsewhere to support precisely opposite argu-
ments.  Moreover, alternative theories grounded in more traditional economic 
reasoning are consistent with both the history of the challenged laws and the 
evidence of actual consumer behavior.  Courts should exert great caution be-
fore resting judicial decision-making on such poorly supported suppositions. 
The plaintiffs in the case (five New York businesses) and their amici 
(scholars of both behavioral law and economics and First Amendment law) 
argued that New York’s ban on surcharge fees (but not discounts for cash pay-
ments) violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment.  The argument 
relied on a claim derived from behavioral economics: that a surcharge and a 
discount are mathematically equivalent, but, because of behavioral biases, a 
price adjustment framed as a surcharge is more effective than one framed as a 
discount in inducing customers to pay with cash in lieu of credit.  The plaintiffs 
and amici claim that the prohibition on surcharging is thus an impermissible 
restriction on commercial speech (and not a permissible regulation of conduct) 
because the only difference between the two, they asserted, is how they are 
labeled. 
Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the 
ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the 
behavioral economic theory nor the evidence adduced to support it justifies the 
plaintiffs’ claims.  The indeterminacy of the behavioral economics underlying 
the claims makes for a behavioral law and economics “just-so story”: an un-
supported hypothesis about the relative effect of surcharges and discounts on 
consumer behavior adduced to achieve a desired legal result but that happens 
to lack any empirical support.  And not only does the evidence not support the 
contention that consumer welfare is increased by permitting card surcharge 
fees, it strongly suggests that, in fact, consumer welfare would be harmed by 
such fees, as they expose consumers to potential opportunistic holdup and rent 
extraction. 
On March 29, 2017, the Supreme Court issued an opinion remanding the 
case for further proceedings.  It did so, however, solely on the basis of First 
Amendment commercial speech claims, holding that the New York state regu-
lation in question implicated speech concerns by limiting how merchants are 
permitted to express the difference when they decide to charge one price for 
payment in cash and another for payment by credit.  Notably, the Supreme 
Court did not address the Behavioral Law and Economics (“BLE”) claims in 
reaching its holding.  Without guidance from the Court to constrain the lower 
court’s consideration of the BLE claims, the lower courts will surely be pushed 
by the merchants and are likely to factor into subsequent decisions in the case 
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assessing whether the law’s speech restrictions are constitutionally permissi-
ble.  Thus, despite the Court resolving the question whether, contrary to the 
state’s argument, enforcement of the New York no-surcharge law implicates 
First Amendment issues, the question of BLE as a guide to judicial deci-
sionmaking is still very much alive in the case – and, of course, may resurface 
again in other, unrelated cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Should merchants be permitted to charge a consumer a higher price if the 
consumer wants to pay with a debit or credit card than if she uses cash or the 
retailer’s proprietary credit card?  In 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument 
in the case of Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,1 a challenge brought 
by New York retailers to strike down a state law2 that prohibits merchants from 
imposing surcharges on consumers who use payment cards.3  Several other 
states, including Florida, California, and Illinois, have enacted similar laws.4  
Critics of state no-surcharge laws (as well as some courts) contend that, be-
cause surcharging and discounting are effectively economically indistinguish-
able, the only difference between them is the label used to describe them and 
thus that banning one of these labels constitutes an impermissible state re-
striction on commercial speech: 
The Eleventh Circuit . . . in reviewing Florida’s credit-card surcharge 
ban under the First Amendment [held that]: “[t]autologically speaking, 
surcharges and discounts are nothing more than two sides of the same 
coin; a surcharge is simply a ‘negative’ discount, and a discount is a 
‘negative’ surcharge.”  The panel thus recognized that the “sole effect” 
of Florida’s surcharge ban was to keep sellers “from uttering the word 
surcharge, criminalizing speech that [was] neither false nor mislead-
ing.”5 
 
 1. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 2. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (LexisNexis 2017). 
 3. A “surcharge” is a fee charged to consumers and added by merchants to a 
product’s stated purchase price in order to recoup the transaction fees charged to mer-
chants by payment card processors.  They are thus imposed on consumers only when 
they pay with a debit or credit card and are sometimes referred to as “credit card sur-
charges,” or “debit card surcharges.”  A “discount,” or “cash discount,” by contrast, is 
a reduction from a product’s advertised purchase price to which an amount has already 
been added to reflect a merchant’s payment card acceptance costs.  Discounts are thus 
offered only to consumers if they pay with cash (in which case the merchant would not 
be charged the anticipated card processing fee). 
 4. Heather Morton, Credit or Debit Card Surcharges Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-
commerce/credit-or-debit-card-surcharges-statutes.aspx. 
 5. Brief of Amici Curiae First Amendment Scholars & First Amendment Law-
yers Assoc. in Support of Petitioners at 13, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
3
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The Second Circuit, reversing the district court, upheld New York’s law 
and rejected the merchants’ claim that permitting merchants to offer “cash dis-
counts,” but not to offer “credit surcharges,” constitutes an impermissible re-
straint on commercial speech under the First Amendment.6  The Supreme Court 
disagreed and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for further consideration 
consistent with the Court’s holding that the New York state law, as applied, 
constitutes commercial speech regulation.7 
Other challenges in other states had been brought on the same or similar 
grounds, resulting in a circuit split with the Second and Fifth Circuits on one 
side and the Eleventh Circuit on the other.8  The merchant challengers of these 
laws argued that, because the laws prohibit them from posting a single, cash 
price (and then charging credit card customers more than the posted price at 
the register), their First Amendment rights were impermissibly restricted under 
the laws.9  The states that have enacted these laws – and the courts that have 
upheld them – argued that the statutes do not limit speech but actually limit 
conduct: the action of imposing a monetary surcharge on a consumer who de-
sires to use a payment card, not the mere labeling of the practice as either a 
cash discount or a surcharge.10  They further argued that, even if the state laws 
do affect speech, they do not impose an impermissible restriction on speech 
under the First Amendment.11  Following the Court’s decision in Expressions 
Hair Design, the argument will now turn to this question. 
Although the merchants’ core argument rests on the First Amendment, 
they invoke Behavioral Law and Economics (“BLE”) to support their claim.  
Specifically, they argue that, from the perspective of consumers, it actually 
matters whether a particular price adjustment is quoted as a surcharge or a dis-
count – that its label, and not its underlying mechanics, affects consumer con-
duct.12  They thus contend that, because consumers “are much more likely to 
respond to surcharges (perceived as losses for using credit) than to discounts 
 
(2017) (No. 15-1391) [hereinafter First Amendment Scholars Merits Amicus] (second 
and third alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151. 
 8. See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 
2015). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 135 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“As applied to single-sticker-price schemes like the ones described in Plaintiffs’ 
submissions, Section 518 regulates conduct, not speech.”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017). 
 11. See id. 
 12. The merchants summarize the behavioral economics logic with a quote from 
Cass Sunstein: “People are averse to losses . . . . [S]imply through inventive terminol-
ogy, it is possible to manipulate the frame so as to make a change appear to be a loss 
rather than a gain, or vice versa[,] . . . . [e.g.,] a company that says ‘cash discount’ rather 
than ‘credit card surcharge.’”  Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences 
and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1312 (2003). 
4
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(perceived as gains for not using credit),”13 the state’s no-surcharge law imper-
missibly restricts speech.14 
Based on various concepts taken from Behavioral Economics (“BE”),15 
the merchants argue that there is no relevant difference between the conduct 
involved in surcharging versus discounting; that labeling a particular price ad-
justment to be a “surcharge” will be more effective at diverting consumers 
away from network-branded credit cards; and that this will lead to increased 
use of supposedly less-expensive payment devices such as cash: 
Because both credit-card surcharges and cash discounts ultimately 
amount to equivalent differences between the price charged to credit-
card customers and the price charged to cash customers . . . [a no-sur-
charging law] burdens protected expression by “draw[ing] the line be-
tween prohibited ‘surcharges’ and permissible ‘discounts’ based on 
words and labels, rather than economic realities.”16 
. . . .  
In Plaintiffs’ view, credit-card surcharges and cash discounts must 
just be labels because consumers react differently to them: they react 
more negatively to credit-card surcharges than they react to cash dis-
counts.17 
 
 13. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. 
Ct. 1144 (2017) (No. 15-1391) (citing Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: 
America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 280 (2005)). 
 14. More specifically, the merchants argue that no-surcharge laws amount to the 
state attempting “to ‘alter [consumer] decisions’ by banning the most ‘effective and 
informative way’ of conveying information” without sufficient justification to meet any 
level of First Amendment scrutiny.  Id. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564, 576 (2011)). 
 15. In this article we distinguish between “Behavioral Economics” (“BE”) on the 
one hand, which refers to the scientific enterprise of discovering certain patterns of 
individual choice that identify certain ostensibly predictable, systematic biases in con-
sumer decision-making, and Behavioral Law and Economics (“BLE”) on the other, 
which refers to the efforts to apply those purported BE biases in the context of legal 
reasoning and policymaking in the real world.  In short, BE seeks to describe and ex-
plain certain seemingly anomalous human behavior, while BLE seeks to justify and 
recommend specific policy interventions based on BE’s behavioral explanations.  
While, as we discuss, BE itself is often extremely indeterminate, its imprecision (and 
even frequent inherent conflicts) are magnified by BLE scholars who pick and choose 
from among its hypotheses and claims in order to contrive “scientific” support for their 
idiosyncratic policy preferences. 
 16. Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 131 (second alteration in original) (quot-
ing Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
 17. Id. at 132. 
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The plaintiff merchants, joined by amici briefs from a number of scholars, in-
voke BLE in support of these claims.18 
The Supreme Court decision remanding the case for further proceedings 
did so on the basis that the Second Circuit erred in holding that the New York 
law does not implicate speech concerns; the Court did not determine whether 
the law actually violates the merchants’ First Amendment rights.19  Without 
guidance from the Court to constrain the lower court’s consideration of the 
BLE claims, those claims will surely be pushed by the merchants and are likely 
to factor into subsequent decisions in the case assessing whether the law’s 
speech restrictions are constitutionally permissible.  Thus, despite the Court 
resolving the question whether, contrary to the state’s argument, enforcement 
of the New York no-surcharge law implicates First Amendment issues, the 
question of BLE as a guide to judicial decision-making is still very much alive 
in the case – and, of course, may resurface again in other, unrelated cases. 20 
 
 18. See Brief of Scholars of Behavioral Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No 15-1391) 
[hereinafter BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus].  While the scholars on whose behalf this brief 
was filed style themselves as “Scholars of Behavioral Economics,” they are not primar-
ily behavioral economists but rather scholars of behavioral law and economics, and all 
but one of the signatories to the brief are law school professors.  The amici include law 
professors Oren Bar-Gill, Susan Block-Lieb, Edward Janger, Adam Levitin, and Lau-
ren Willis, Professor of Law and Psychology Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, and economist 
Jonathan Zinman.  Although the brief was filed on behalf of the entire group, the un-
derlying arguments were developed by Professor Adam J. Levitin approximately a dec-
ade earlier, and the brief closely follows Levitin’s analysis.  See Adam J. Levitin, Price-
less? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321 
(2008); see also Levitin, supra note 13. 
 19. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1150–51. 
 20. The Court considered the New York law only as applied in a context where it 
prohibits a merchant from using a “one-sticker pricing scheme” to advertise a price of, 
say, $10 and later charge $10.30 for credit customers or even to advertise “$10, plus a 
3 percent surcharge for credit.”  See id. at 1149.  It appears to assume (and the statute’s 
language appears to say) that using a one-sticker scheme to advertise $10.30 or adver-
tise “$10.30, minus a $.30 discount for cash” is permissible.  See id.  It did not consider 
whether the two were equivalent, nor whether the prohibition of one and not the other 
was improper.  In fact, the Court noted that the constitutionality of the law may ulti-
mately turn on whether it is permissible under the law to use a “two-sticker pricing 
scheme[],” Id. at 1151 n.3, such as “$10 cash; $10.30 credit.”  The implication is that 
if the statute does not apply “where a merchant displays in dollars-and-cents form only 
the credit card price and then charges a lower price to cash customers, or where a mer-
chant displays both the cash and credit card prices in dollars-and-cents form,” Id. at 
1154 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), it is possible that the prohibition on the one-sticker 
scheme may not affect a substantial enough restriction on speech to violate the First 
Amendment.  As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, the Court “does not de-
cide whether §518’s restriction is constitutionally permissible because doing so would 
require it to answer the ever-present question in this case: ‘whether the statute permits 
. . . [two-sticker] pricing schemes like the one . . . Expressions currently uses.’”  Id. at 
1159 (quoting Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151 n.3 (majority opinion)).  
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Further, it is worth noting that the Court held that 
the Court of Appeals had no occasion to conduct a further inquiry into 
whether § 518, as a speech regulation, survived First Amendment scru-
tiny.  On that question, the parties dispute whether § 518 is a valid com-
mercial speech regulation . . . and whether the law can be upheld as a 
valid disclosure requirement under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio . . . . 
. . . [W]e decline to consider those questions in the first instance.  
Instead, we remand for the Court of Appeals to analyze § 518 as a 
speech regulation.21 
The BLE arguments adduced in this case have been used to support (we believe 
inaptly) the contention that no-surcharge laws do not perform a valid consumer 
protection function.  But, as we discuss at length below, a proper understanding 
of the consumer/merchant dynamics surrounding surcharging and discounting 
strongly suggests otherwise.22  In Zauderer, in fact, the Court held that the 
state’s regulation of speech was permissible to prevent deception in circum-
stances quite similar to those in this case, in which an “advertisement makes 
no mention of the distinction between ‘[] fees’ and ‘costs,’ and to a layman . . 
. , the advertisement would suggest . . . a no-lose proposition.”23  Whether or 
not New York’s statute meets the requirements of Zauderer (upon which we 
do not opine), it is virtually certain that the BLE arguments will be employed 
on remand to support the claim that it does not. 
The Trouble with the BLE Arguments in Expressions Hair Design 
Although behavioral law and economics has taken the legal academy by 
storm in the past decade, the effort to justify the plaintiffs’ case with BLE anal-
ysis represents one of the highest-profile efforts to date to try to leverage be-
havioral economics for legal and policy change.24  As such, this case is partic-
ularly important in that it represents the first major opportunity for the appellate 
 
Nowhere does the Court assert or imply that the relevant comparison is between a one-
sticker surcharge scheme and a one-sticker discount scheme, however. 
 21. Id. at 1151 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 22. See infra The Consequences for Information Disclosure and Disclosure Reg-
ulation. 
 23. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 652 (1985). 
 24. Brief of Scholars of Behavioral Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of Pe-
titioners at 2, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct.  1144 (No. 15-1391) [hereinafter BE 
Scholars Merits Amicus] (“Amici believe that this case – which concerns the signifi-
cance of framing effects under the First Amendment – presents perhaps the first oppor-
tunity for this Court to consider the insights of behavioral-economic theory in reaching 
its decision.”). 
7
Zywicki et al.: Behavioral Economics Goes to Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
776 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
courts to confront BLE, to evaluate the scientific validity of BLE arguments, 
and to determine how those arguments will be applied and interpreted in future 
cases.  Thus, we believe that the arguments in this case are worthy of particular 
scrutiny. 
Because of the nature of the litigation, although the plaintiffs have offered 
these arguments in their case – indeed, they comprise the opening pages in the 
plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, permeate their Supreme 
Court merits’ brief,25 and constitute the focus of several amicus briefs in sup-
port of the plaintiffs26 – the states that have defended the law in court have not 
addressed the BLE arguments that have been raised.  Instead, the states have 
focused on the narrow, doctrinal aspects of the First Amendment and Due Pro-
cess issues at stake.27  As a result, although the plaintiffs and amicus supporters 
have invoked BLE arguments in support of their case, their assertions and rep-
resentations have not yet been seriously scrutinized by courts, including the 
Supreme Court.28 
Moreover, judges in several of the cases have considered the plaintiffs’ 
BLE arguments in a largely approving manner.29  Even where courts have re-
jected the First Amendment challenges and upheld the laws, in some cases the 
judges have nevertheless uncritically accepted the accuracy of the BLE claims 
even if they ultimately considered them to be irrelevant to the core claims of 
the case or insufficient to strike down the state laws.30 
In this article, we take no position on the First Amendment questions re-
garding whether anti-surcharge laws represent impermissible restrictions on 
merchant speech or conduct; there may well be non-BLE, doctrinal bases for 
treating anti-surcharge laws as impermissible infringements on speech.  But we 
do take issue with the manner in which BLE arguments have been used in Ex-
pressions Hair Design.  And, to the extent that the First Amendment arguments 
turn on BLE and on the merchants’ presentation of the BLE literature, we find 
them seriously wanting.  Because of the significance of BLE to this case, and 
 
 25. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13. 
 26. See, e.g., BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 3; First Amendment 
Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 5, at 15–16; Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor 
Adam J. Levitin in Support of Petitioners at 26, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 
1144 (No. 15-1391). 
 27. The Second Circuit, for example, effectively side-stepped the issue by holding 
that the statute at issue “does not prohibit sellers from referring to credit-cash price 
differentials as credit-card surcharges, or from engaging in advocacy related to credit-
card surcharges; it simply prohibits imposing credit-card surcharges.”  Expressions 
Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 
1144 (2017). 
 28. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151–52. 
 29. See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 
2015); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017). 
 30. See Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1204. 
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because this case may set a precedent for the future use of BLE by courts, those 
arguments demand deeper scrutiny to understand the nature and accuracy of 
the claims. 
The BLE scholars who have weighed in on the case (particularly in ami-
cus briefs before the Supreme Court) argue that merchants must be permitted 
to offer card surcharges and not merely cash discounts because, although they 
result in the “same” ultimate conduct (i.e., differential pricing depending upon 
the form of payment), surcharging is a more forceful means of persuading con-
sumers to shift to alternate payment schemes: 
In the context of credit card surcharging, behavioral economics has 
shown that consumers react very differently to discounts and sur-
charges.  A discount is perceived as a “reward” for a cash purchase, 
generating a mild, positive reaction.  A surcharge is perceived as a “pen-
alty” for a credit purchase, garnering a much stronger, negative reac-
tion.  In this way, a merchant’s ability to incentivize use of a preferred 
payment method is diminished by the limits no-surcharge laws place on 
the way the merchants describe the price differential.31 
For these scholars, “surcharges and cash discounts are just two ways of con-
veying identical information about the relationship between two prices.”32  
That is, they assert, both practices comprise the same conduct but are simply 
described using different words.  As a group of First Amendment Scholars who 
weighed in on behalf of the plaintiffs describe it: 
This analysis presumes that a “surcharge” exists only when a seller re-
quires a credit-card user to pay more than a given sticker price (e.g., 
“$100 plus $2 for credit-card users”).  But a surcharge exists in equal 
measure when a seller requires a credit-card user to pay more than a 
cash user (e.g., “$102 minus $2 for cash users”).  In both instances, the 
consumer pays more for using a credit card (i.e., $102) – the only dif-
ference is how the seller explains this excess charge to the consumer 
(i.e., by using the term “surcharge” versus “discount”).33 
But the BLE scholars also assert that, despite describing identical con-
duct, people respond differently to the different labels, meaning that the differ-
ent labels themselves supposedly have different effects on consumer behav-
ior.34  Thus, statutes that prohibit one form of communication and not the other 
amount to impermissible restrictions on speech.  As the Second Circuit neatly 
sums it up: “In Plaintiffs’ view, [given their equivalent mathematical content,] 
 
 31. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 3. 
 32. Id. at 2. 
 33. First Amendment Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 5, at 12–13. 
 34. BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 3. 
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credit-card surcharges and cash discounts must just be labels because consum-
ers react differently to them: they react more negatively to credit-card sur-
charges than they react to cash discounts.”35 
This argument assumes that merely calling the behavior surcharging in-
stead of discounting can convey valuable information that will affect consumer 
behavior differently depending on which framing is used.  Crucial to the argu-
ment is that these labels are applied to functionally identical behavior – that 
there is no difference in the conduct involved or behavior entailed when a mer-
chant assesses a surcharge as opposed to a cash discount.36 
Right off the bat, however, there is an obvious problem with this argu-
ment.  As the example above suggests, a merchant must set a different base 
price for discounting and surcharging if she is going to maintain their mathe-
matical equivalence.  In other words, a pricing scheme advertising a price of 
$100 and adding a $2 fee for credit-card users at the register requires the mer-
chant to decide upon and post a different price than does a pricing scheme ad-
vertising a price of $102 and subtracting a $2 discount for cash users.  Because 
a posted price affects (and is affected by) market competition, it may not be 
equally feasible for a merchant to set the posted, base price at both amounts 
(here, $100 and $102) necessary to maintain the mathematical equivalence as-
serted by stylized examples. 
At the same time, a surcharge is manifestly not the same as a discount: 
When a consumer is met at the register with a higher price than that posted 
when she selected the store or chose her items (all of a sudden $100 becomes 
$102) there is an element of deception or coercion in the pricing scheme.37  
With a discount, by contrast, any “deception” is harmless, and shoppers are 
effectively offered an option at the register to pay what they expected or to 
receive an additional discount if they pay using cash.  What looks like some-
thing akin to coercion with a surcharge becomes an expansion of consumer 
choice with a discount. 
Posting a price and adding a(n undisclosed) surcharge later, is a sort of 
bait-and-switch advertising.38  And credit-card surcharges are in fact some-
times employed in precisely this manner: to allow merchants to entice potential 
customers by advertising a low regular price and then “hold up” customers who 
 
 35. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 36. Although it is not entirely clear, the Supreme Court may have adopted this 
position.  It certainly agreed that surcharging and thus New York’s no-surcharge law 
affect speech, as well as conduct. But it did not definitively hold that they are solely 
about speech.  See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151. 
 37. Obviously, a lower price at the register because of a discount would also rep-
resent a deviation from the posted price, but for equally obvious reasons there is no 
harm associated with such a deviation, and no one would call it “deceptive.” 
 38. See Hélène Bourguignon, Renato Gomes & Jean Tirole, Card Surcharges and 
Cash Discounts: Simple Economics and Regulatory Lessons, 10 COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L 12, 20 (2014). 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/13
2017] BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GOES TO COURT 779 
wish to pay (or who can only pay) via credit card.39  Because this practice “re-
duce[s] the extent to which consumers [can] shop around and compare full 
price offers,” it “weakens the competitive pressure between retailers” and often 
results in “consumers not getting the best deal.”40 
To illustrate, suppose a consumer wants to buy a mattress.  Store A ad-
vertises a price of $1000, while Store B advertises a price of $1030.  Because 
the consumer buys a mattress only once every ten years, she does not readily 
know that only Store B’s advertised price reflects all relevant surcharges, nor 
does she know that Store A imposes a surcharge at the register or the amount 
of the surcharge.  Accordingly, the consumer decides to shop at Store A.  After 
spending an hour laying down on every mattress in the store, the consumer 
finally chooses the one she wants to buy.  But when she reaches the checkout, 
the consumer learns that the advertised price of $1000 does not include a 6% 
surcharge, which brings the grand total to $1060.  Because the consumer is 
carrying only $22 in cash (the amount the typical American consumer car-
ries),41 and because the $30 difference between the two stores’ credit-card 
prices may well be less than the value of the time it would take to find a com-
parable mattress at Store B, the customer is effectively locked into paying the 
higher price.42 
None of this dynamic plays out in the case of a discount, which either 
allows the consumer to complete her transaction as expected or else, without 
shopping further or searching for another store, complete her transaction in 
cash at a lower price. 
Finally, as the BLE scholars themselves argue, discounting and surcharg-
ing do have different effects on consumer behavior.43  As we discuss below, all 
available evidence suggests that they are wrong about the direction of the rel-
ative effects, but certainly they could (and quite possibly do) have different 
effects.  Supporters of the merchants’ position argue that this shows that the 
different labels matter (and thus that they should be protected as speech).44  But 
 
 39. Id. 
 40.  OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, PAYMENT SURCHARGES: RESPONSE TO THE WHICH? 
SUPER-COMPLAINT 7 (2012), http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/super-com-
plaints/OFT1349resp.pdf [hereinafter OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY]. 
 41. See CLAIRE GREENE & SCOTT SCHUH, CONSUMERS’ HOLDINGS AND USE OF 
$100 BILLS 3 (2014), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/research-data-re-
port/2014/us-consumers-holdings-and-use-of-100-bills.aspx. 
 42. Advertising, review websites, and the like can, in some cases, inform the con-
sumer of the surcharge, of course, even if she does not have first-hand knowledge.  But 
these devices are imperfect, and the “bait-and-switch” dynamic will play out at the 
margin as long as search costs are positive.  As we discuss below, it is for this reason 
that merchants tend to impose at-the-register surcharges where search costs tend to be 
higher (e.g., in the travel industry).  See infra The Evidence Points Toward the Eco-
nomic Story, Not the BLE One. 
 43. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 14. 
 44. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1312. 
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it is far more straightforward to see that a discount is meaningfully different 
than a surcharge, whatever their nominal mathematical equivalence, and that 
the difference is not simply a function of how they are labeled but rather how 
they are devised, implemented, and disclosed by merchants, and how they are 
understood by consumers. 
Of course, this does not mean that the New York law may not also restrict 
speech.  Importantly, the Court’s ruling to that effect did not turn on the as-
serted equivalence of a discount and a surcharge.45  Instead, the Court based its 
ruling on its determination that, unlike a traditional price regulation, the New 
York law does not mandate a specific price but instead mandates the particular 
pricing scheme by which that price is implemented.46  The Court focuses on 
the communication aspect of that implementation, but it does not hold that the 
only difference between a permissible and an impermissible pricing scheme is 
how it is communicated.47  Moreover, the Court demurred on the crucial ques-
tion of disclosure and deception (and the statute’s consumer protection pur-
pose).  And by oversimplifying its characterization of the sort of pricing 
schemes the statute is meant to restrict48 the Court even obscures the problem: 
Consumers may generally understand that “$10, with a 3% credit card sur-
charge” is the same as “$10 for cash and $10.30 for credit,” but they may have 
no idea what the penalty for credit is if a merchant charges “$126.79, plus 
17.83% for credit.” 
In this article, we address the BLE arguments and evidence that have been 
advanced in support of the claim that merely calling a certain practice a credit 
surcharge as opposed to a cash discount will affect consumer behavior in a 
predictable manner and, in particular, that assessing a credit surcharge instead 
of offering a cash discount will be more effective at leading consumers to pay 
for retail transactions with cash rather than credit.  Examining the accuracy of 
this claim, we find that both economic theory and the available empirical evi-
dence strongly rebut the BLE arguments that have been advanced.  The argu-
ments that have been presented to courts – including the Supreme Court – are 
at best confused, and at worse disingenuous and misleading, especially regard-
ing their characterization of the limited empirical evidence that is available to 
date. 
More fundamentally, the existing state of the BE literature on which the 
BLE arguments are based is not sufficiently firm to provide a foundation for 
entrenching those concepts in policy, much less constitutional law.  The Su-
preme Court (and lower courts) should be especially wary of doing so when, 
as here, standard economic analysis provides a more persuasive and empiri-
 
 45. See supra note 20 for an illustration of “equivalent” discounts and surcharges. 
 46. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1148 (2017). 
 47. Id. at 1150–51. 
 48. Id. at 1151 (“A merchant who wants to charge $10 for cash and $10.30 for 
credit may not convey that price any way he pleases.  He is not free to say ‘$10, with a 
3% credit card surcharge . . . .’”). 
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cally-grounded justification for treating surcharging and discounting differ-
ently, as well as for private or state restrictions on credit card surcharging.  In-
deed, because the more traditional analysis points toward merchant opportun-
ism (not, as the BLE arguments would have it, consumer protection) as the 
basis for its advocacy in favor of the ability to surcharge for credit payments, 
courts should be even more cautious in adopting BLE theory that may be noth-
ing more than a convenient rationale for merchants seeking to extract wealth 
from consumers. 
Further, in some instances the key studies relied upon by the plaintiffs 
and their supporters actually rebut the claims for which the studies are ad-
vanced.49  In particular, available evidence indicates that cash discounting may 
actually be more effective than surcharging at persuading consumers to switch 
to an alternative form of payment.50  Studies that the merchants advance in 
support of their contrary argument either in fact contradict their argument or 
simply do not stand for the conclusions for which the merchants offer them: 
that the “negative” penalty of surcharging is more effective at shaping con-
sumer behavior than is cash discounting.  In addition, we have located evidence 
drawn from real-world contexts (rather than surveys based on hypothetical sce-
narios), not discussed by the merchants or BLE scholars, that further confirms 
our analysis challenging the claim that surcharging is more effective than cash 
discounting in altering consumer conduct. 
It is important to note, however, that critics of no-surcharge rules do assert 
their own strategic story for the defense of no-surcharge rules offered by pay-
ment card networks.  In brief, some scholars suggest that, precisely because 
surcharging is more effective than discounting at moving consumers away 
from payment cards, networks and card issuers have worked more vigorously 
to influence lawmakers to enact laws discouraging surcharging relative to those 
discouraging discounting.  Indeed, it appears that the existing state no-sur-
charge rules were proposed and enacted in part due to lobbying by the payment 
card industry,51 and pressure for more of these bans continues apace.52  Assum-
ing this behavior was rational, those lobbyists certainly believed there was 
something to be gained from such lobbying.53 
 
 49. See infra Consumers Dislike Surcharging More Than They Like Discounting: 
The Dutch Study. 
 50. See infra Consumers Dislike Surcharging More Than They Like Discounting: 
The Dutch Study. 
 51. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017); Levitin, supra note 13, at 276 n.35. 
 52. See Credit or Debit Card Interest, Surcharges, and Fees 2013 Legislation, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 15, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/finan-
cial-services-and-commerce/credit-or-debit-card-surcharges-2013-legis.aspx. 
 53. Bolstering these claims, it also appears that federal agencies, including the 
FTC, were actively against extending the federal ban on surcharges.  See S. REP. NO. 
97-23, at 10 (1981).  And – at least according to the plaintiffs in the Second Circuit case 
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Thus, it could be the case that the industry believes surcharging is more 
effective at altering consumer behavior than is discounting54 and that some fed-
eral agencies believe that surcharge bans do not, in fact, protect consumers.  
But it also does not matter: The question at hand is not whether the payment 
card companies believe that in some instances surcharging is more effective at 
altering consumer behavior but what the evidence shows regarding the effects 
on consumer welfare.  And on this question, our interpretation of the evidence 
indicates that surcharging is no more effective than discounting at encouraging 
consumers to use cash (or is even less effective at doing so).55 
If our interpretation is accurate, this reality is also presumably understood 
by the merchants, who have the best, private evidence regarding the effects of 
the practices.  So why then do merchants nevertheless insist on retaining the 
right to surcharge, if their claimed objective – moving customers to cheaper 
forms of payment – is best accomplished by discounting?  We consider an al-
ternative hypothesis: that merchants seek the power to surcharge (in addition 
to their already-guaranteed right to discount) in order to price discriminate 
against certain consumers, especially those consumers who face limited alter-
natives to using payment cards to make certain types of purchases, such as air-
line tickets, hotels, and other travel purchases.  Indeed, it seems that merchants 
prefer surcharging to discounting not because consumers are more likely to 
switch to cash in the face of a surcharge but precisely because consumers are 
less likely to switch. 
Examining the experience of countries that have permitted surcharging of 
card payments, including England, Australia, and the Netherlands, it is appar-
ent that merchants do not impose surcharges merely to recover their costs of 
card acceptance.56  Instead, the surcharges imposed tend to be at levels far 
above cost and tend to be imposed where market conditions best enable mer-
 
– the card industry went to the effort of creating an “astroturf” consumer group to op-
pose merchant surcharging.  See Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees Expressions 
Hair Design, et al. at 11–12, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 
133 (2d Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-4533, 13-4537).  We hasten to note, however, that the 
evidence cited in the brief for the “astroturf” claim was not actually accessible as pro-
vided. 
 54. It bears noting, however, that both surcharging and discounting were banned 
in the original network agreements, so it may just be the case that these companies 
prefer to handle all contingencies, without necessarily believing any one of them is 
more likely than another. 
 55. In fact, a recent paper published by the Boston Fed finds that consumers are 
more likely to alter their behavior in response to cash discounting than to surcharging. 
See Joanna Stavins and Huijia Wu, Payment Discounts and Surcharges: The Role of 
Consumer Preferences (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 17–4), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995874##. 
 56. See Amelia Murray, EU Ban on Credit Card Fees Backfires – You’ll Still 
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chants to take advantage of consumers for whom paying with credit is prefer-
able, even in the face of excessive fees.57  In fact, it is precisely because of their 
fear that merchants would opportunistically take advantage of consumers who 
need to use payment cards that card networks have insisted on banning sur-
charging in their service contracts with merchants since the earliest days of 
general acceptance credit cards issued by American Express and Bank Ameri-
Card.58 
In 2013, however, the networks settled antitrust litigation brought by a 
class of merchants, accepting a settlement term that resulted in the elimination 
of their use of contractual bans on surcharging.59  Nevertheless, the underlying 
concerns that animated the card networks to include those provisions in their 
contracts remain.  Whether those concerns are properly addressed by state laws 
that continue to ban surcharging, or by more sensible antitrust policies (and 
better-drafted settlements) is an issue we do not directly address in this article.  
Nevertheless, whatever the merits of any particular piece of legislation, our 
analysis does point to a seemingly legitimate consumer protection issue. 
For current purposes, however, our conclusion is simple but, we believe, 
crucial: In the realm of consumer credit regulation, at least, judges, legislators, 
and regulators should remain skeptical toward arguments for legal reform 
based on BE and BLE.  Although it is certainly possible that future evidence 
might support BE hypotheses and the relevance to the evaluation of consumer 
credit regulations given by BLE analysis, to date the evidence fails to do so.  
Indeed, so indeterminate are the conclusions of behavioral economics and the 
resulting claims made by BLE scholars that the United Kingdom’s Office of 
Fair Trading (“OFT”) has published a comprehensive study concluding that 
permitting credit card surcharging can be harmful to consumers – and pointing 
to precisely the same biases invoked by American BLE scholars to reach ex-
actly the opposite policy implications.60 
And, especially as various ideas derived from BLE scholarship continue 
to seep into the conventional wisdom of the legal academy, it is important to 
reiterate that the failure of the evidence to support BLE scholars’ claims re-
garding surcharging is not unique.  For one financial market and product after 
another, BLE theorists have constructed models of supposed systematic con-
sumer bias and irrationality, purportedly supporting the writers’ particular pref-
erences for legal and regulatory reform.  But in case after case, these theories 
and their claimed implications fail to stand up once they are actually evaluated 
 
 57. See id. 
 58. As professor Adam Levitin recounts, the then-vice-president and general 
counsel of Carte Blanche testified before Congress that the first no-surcharge/no-dis-
count provision was introduced by Diner’s Club in the 1950s to address the problem of 
merchants who advertised cash discounts to Diner’s Club users.  See Levitin, supra 
note 18, at 1372–73. 
 59. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. 
Supp. 2d 207, 213–14 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d and vacated, 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
 60. See generally OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40. 
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and tested against available evidence, including with respect to: debit cards,61 
credit card borrowing,62 credit card fees,63 bankruptcy,64 household savings be-
havior,65 payday loans,66 consumer use of overdraft protection,67 and subprime 
mortgages.68 
It is virtually impossible to escape the conclusion that, whatever promise 
BE and BLE may hold, they as yet offer little more than a host of oft-conflicting 
theories and “just-so stories” insufficient to explain consumer behavior or jus-
tify its regulation in any particular fashion.69 This uniformly underwhelming 
track record of BLE in attempting to convert supposed anomalies found in eco-
nomics lab experiments into real-world realities should give courts serious 
pause before following academia into the faddish regulatory proposals offered 
by BLE academics. 
II. SURCHARGES, DISCOUNTS, AND PAYMENT CARD 
REGULATION: EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN 
The use of consumer credit to facilitate retail transactions is almost as old 
as retailing itself – and so, too, are the problems of strategic behavior by retail-
ers and the use of various institutional devices (like no-surcharge rules) to com-
bat them. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Sears and Roebuck introduced 
its famous catalogue, which was aimed at rural communities and expanded the 
 
 61. See Thomas A. Durkin, Gregory Elliehausen & Todd J. Zywicki, An Assess-
ment of Behavioral Law and Economics Contentions and What We Know Empirically 
About Credit Card Use by Consumers, 22 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 33–35 (2014). 
 62. See Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 passim (2006). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of 
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679 passim (1998). 
 65. See Todd J. Zywicki, Do Americans Really Save Too Little and Should We 
Nudge Them to Save More? The Ethics of Nudging Retirement Savings, 14 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 877 passim (2016). 
 66. See Ronald Mann, Testing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers, 21 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 105, 129 (2014). 
 67. See Adam Smith & Todd J. Zywicki, Nudging in an Evolving Marketplace: 
How Markets Improve Their Own Choice Architecture 18–21 (Geo. Mason Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 16–21, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2757712. 
 68. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Fixed-Rate Mort-
gages (And Other Just-So Stories), 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157 passim (2014) [here-
inafter Zywicki, Just-So Stories]. 
 69. See id. 
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range of goods available to purchase.  In order to shop from the Sears and Roe-
buck catalogue, however, consumers were required to have a Sears charge ac-
count.70 
As the American consumer economy grew rapidly during the inter-War 
and post-World War II era, credit and its related delivery technologies under-
went similarly rapid development.71 
Despite the high costs and risk of offering credit services to consumers, 
department stores did not impose a surcharge on their customers that used 
credit nor did they typically provide a discount for cash customers.  Instead, 
department stores typically operated their credit operations at a loss, essentially 
resulting in cash customers subsidizing credit customers.  Moreover, because 
of strict usury ceilings in some states,72 retailers would mark up the sticker 
price of the goods most frequently purchased on credit – appliances, furniture, 
and other household durable goods – in order to offset losses on their credit 
operations.73 
Despite these economic realities, department stores offered credit to their 
customers as a convenience, to enable efficient household investment in con-
sumer durable goods, and to build customer loyalty – a strategy that increased 
sales over time.74  And this subsidization continues today at many stores.  For 
instance, in its “REDcard” program, Target bears both the risk of default and 
the cost of billing and operations.  Thus, by definition, those consumers who 
use the REDcard are costlier for Target than those who use cash.  Nevertheless, 
Target does not surcharge REDcard customers, nor does it even charge the 
same price; instead, Target subsidizes use of its REDcard by offering five per-
cent back on all purchases.75  Yet Target offers this subsidy because of the 
value that the REDcard provides to the store in the form of convenience to 
consumers, attendant consumer loyalty, and valuable marketing information 
 
 70. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 92–
93 (2000). 
 71. See THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E. STATEN & 
TODD J. ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 34–87 (2014). 
 72. Prior to Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., states were 
free to set usury limits on credit cards based on the location of the borrower.  Marquette 
Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).  After Marquette, how-
ever, the usury limit was determined based on the principal location of the lending in-
stitution – a change that led to a competition among states to progressively increase and 
eventually eliminate usury limits.  David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of 
Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 333 
(1999). 
 73. See generally Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange 
Fees and the Limits of Regulation (Geo. Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10–
26, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624002. 
 74. See generally id. 
 75. REDcard, TARGET, http://www.target.com/c/redcard/-/N-4tfyn (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2017). 
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that the program generates.  Macy’s similarly offers special discounts and ben-
efits (such as free shipping for online shoppers) to customers who use its store-
brand card, despite the cost and risk to the retailer of running its own store-
brand card system.76 
Programs like these, which offer a (costly) benefit only to cardholders and 
which do not offer any offsetting discount to cash customers, also effectively 
entail a cross-subsidy from cash customers to cardholders.  And, more gener-
ally, cross-subsidies between different types of consumers are ubiquitous in 
American retailing, not just with respect to credit versus cash. Such subsidy 
differentiation often includes features like free parking, free assistance by sales 
clerks in a store, free returns, and a host of other unpriced (“free”) conveniences 
that retailers provide and for which the benefitting customers are not charged.77  
In such instances (and there are many), the result is a cross-subsidy from con-
sumers who do not avail themselves of the special benefit to those who do. 
In 1950, Diner’s Club introduced the first general purpose charge cards.78  
Unlike previous charge and credit cards, which were accepted at only one retail 
chain or gas company, Diner’s Club created a network of hotels and restaurants 
that would accept the card.  As a general acceptance card, Diner’s Club pro-
vided a huge convenience for both consumers as well as the retailers that ac-
cepted it: The card’s network effects enlarged the pool of potential customers 
and retailers to each group’s mutual benefit. 
In addition, accepting Diner’s Club relieved a merchant of the cost and 
risk associated with running its own internal credit system.  This enabled 
smaller and independent restaurants and hotels to more directly compete with 
large department stores, gasoline companies, and retailers who could otherwise 
more easily afford to cover the costs and risks of internally run credit systems. 
Yet, despite the value provided to consumers and merchants from the de-
velopment of general purpose payment cards, these cards also created a new 
problem that traditional retail credit did not – when retailers provided their own 
credit, they captured both the benefit and bore the cost of their operations.  Ac-
cepting general purpose charge and credit cards provided a benefit to mer-
chants by relieving them from the burden and cost of providing their own store 
credit (and, perhaps, by increasing sales).79  Nevertheless, merchants had an 
incentive to try to appropriate the value of the card network without bearing 
the cost. 
Consider a restaurant in New York City that catered to traveling business-
men, for example. The restaurant could advertise itself as being part of the  
 76. Macy’s Credit Card, MACY’S, https://www.macys.com/creditservice/gateway 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2017). 
 77. See id.; REDcard, supra note 75. 
 78. The Story Behind the Card, DINER’S CLUB INT’L, https://www.din-
ersclubus.com/home/about/dinersclub/story (last visited Aug. 31, 2017). 
 79. See IAN LEE, GEOFFREY A. MANNE, JULIAN MORRIS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, 
CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE: HOW PAYMENT CARDS BENEFIT CANADIAN MERCHANTS AND 
CONSUMERS, AND HOW REGULATION CAN HARM THEM 8 (2013), http://www.macdon-
aldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/MLIPaymentCardRegulation10-13Draft5.pdf. 
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Diner’s Club network, thereby associating itself with the Diner’s Club brand 
and gaining access to an upscale, high-value market of potential customers.  
Yet, at the same time, many of these customers would not be repeat customers 
(which is one important reason why the restaurant would market itself as part 
of the Diner’s Club network: to signal potential patrons otherwise unfamiliar 
with the establishment).  As a result, the restaurant would have an incentive to 
lure customers in by branding and advertising itself as part of the Diner’s Club 
network but also to later impose a surcharge on these customers’ bills in an 
effort to recoup the seven percent merchant discount that it had to pay to 
Diner’s Club (and, where possible, a little extra, as well).80 
This example could be replicated in many other markets, notably those 
related to travel and tourist services, that cater to those who have a particularly 
high demand for using credit cards and for which merchants may expect a rel-
atively low level of repeat patronage.  This sort of scheme – in which a mer-
chant attempts to obtain the benefits of association with a payment network but 
rids itself of the costs – is readily facilitated by surcharging non-repeat or price-
insensitive customers like tourists or businesspeople making purchases on an 
expense account.  By advertising a lower price (one that does not already in-
clude the merchant’s card acceptance costs), the merchant makes itself more 
attractive to customers who are searching for an establishment and who do not 
know or do not care that the advertised price is lower than the actual price they 
will pay.  And if there is no expectation of repeat business from a particular 
customer, or if she is price insensitive, there is little incentive for a merchant 
to avoid saddling the customer with an unwelcome, surprise fee.  Regular cus-
tomers, on the other hand, and even non-regular or potential customers who 
live nearby and learn about the pricing scheme from neighbors or other sources 
of localized knowledge, will know that the advertised price does not reflect the 
actual price.  These customers may well be deterred by the merchant’s scheme.  
But as long as there are enough of the former to mitigate the loss of the latter, 
the merchant will persist.  Thus, one should expect to find that merchants are 
more likely to engage in such pricing tactics where tourists, businesspeople, 
and other such consumers congregate. 
In other words, some merchants will naturally have an incentive to engage 
in strategic behavior – attempting to capture for themselves the full value of 
the card network, only to turn around and price discriminate by imposing a 
surcharge to try to recoup the cost that they pay for that service.  Whatever the 
reduction in the network’s value caused by this conduct, each merchant would 
bear only a fraction of that cost but enjoy the full benefit of the surcharge.  So, 
each establishment in the network would have the individual incentive to cheat 
to the collective harm of everyone. 
 
 80. The original Diner’s Club charged an annual fee of five dollars to users (equiv-
alent to forty-nine dollars today) and a fee of seven to ten percent of the charge to the 
business that accepted the card.  See Alan Flippen, The Dawn of Diners Club, and the 
Credit Card, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/10/24/upshot/the-dawn-of-diners-club-and-the-credit-card.html. 
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By constraining merchants from opportunistically imposing surcharges 
on consumers at the point of sale, the network guarantees a “frictionless and 
consistent point-of-sale experience when using their . . . cards,” as the District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York recently wrote in a related context.81  
Restraining opportunistic surcharging benefits all of the members of the net-
work by guaranteeing the ubiquitous and non-discriminatory acceptance of 
cards and thus increasing its adoption by consumers, issuers, and merchants 
alike.  This collective benefit also explains why merchants would agree to a 
network-wide no-surcharge rule: to constrain other merchants’ behavior.  Each 
merchant individually wants to engage in strategic behavior because doing so 
nets her all the benefit but only a small fraction of the cost of undermining the 
value of the network overall.  But knowing that this is true of everyone else on 
the network, as well, and that the network could collapse if they all acted stra-
tegically, each merchant individually is also willing to forego her own potential 
excess reward in order to preserve the network.  The no-surcharge rule, there-
fore, serves to address the prisoner’s dilemma caused by the individual mer-
chant’s incentive to gain the benefits of the network while also trying to oppor-
tunistically appropriate economic rents afterwards by imposing surcharges on 
particular users, which reduces the overall benefit to all users.82  Notably, cash 
discounting does not raise the same issues because the opportunity for strategic 
behavior is removed. 
This also explains why merchants would want to surcharge third-party, 
general purpose cards (such as Diner’s Club in the past or Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express, or Discover today) yet would not impose a surcharge on 
their own proprietary card operations, for which they bear both the full cost 
and benefit.83  The opportunity to surcharge third-party cards enables mer-
chants to gain the benefits of being part of the card network without having to 
bear the full costs. 
 
 81. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d, United States v. Am. Express. Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 82. In this sense, the incentives of individual merchants resemble the anti-com-
mons problems identified in the often-studied example of the Rhine River during the 
Middle Ages.  When the Holy Roman Empire controlled the entire river, it had the 
incentive to set the tax at a rate that maximized the value of the river.  When the Holy 
Roman Empire fell, however, the river was controlled by a succession of local German 
barons along its length.  The barons instead had the incentive to maximize their own 
individual revenue and so each baron asserted a high tax.  The overall effect was a 
disastrous drop in the value of the river as a trading enterprise and a collapse in traffic 
along the river.  See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 20–21 (2008); 
see also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and 
Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000). 
 83. Notably, merchants consistently demand the right to surcharge selectively, pre-
sumably so that they can continue to subsidize some preferred payment mechanisms 
(such as store-brand cards) even if those payment devices are more expensive than al-
ternatives (such as cash). 
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More significant than merchants’ concerns, however, were the commer-
cial demands of the card issuing banks, which would bear the brunt of the cost 
through either lower direct fees charged to consumers or lower merchant ac-
ceptance of their cards.  In order to restrain the incentives for retailer oppor-
tunism, card issuers view as an essential component of merchant agreements 
an ability to restrain merchants from passing on the costs of participation in a 
payment card network to customers.  From early on in the history of general 
acceptance credit cards, merchant agreements included provisions prohibiting 
surcharges and other efforts to pass on the costs of membership to consumers, 
issuers, or other third parties.84  In this sense, the card networks were essentially 
requiring that those retailers that accepted their cards would have to treat their 
cards at least no worse than their own in-house credit operations. 
And far from embodying a one-sided effort by issuers to take advantage 
of merchants, these so-called “merchant restraints” were consumer protection 
devices designed to limit opportunistic behavior by those merchants who 
wished to charge consumers a higher price every time they desired to use the 
card – thereby adding to the consumer’s own cost of participation, which often 
included annual membership fees.  And because many merchants would have 
realized that there was a net benefit in the network restraining fellow mer-
chants, they would have (and did) accede to such provisions. 
It is thus notable, but not surprising, that merchant restraints on poten-
tially opportunistic behavior have been part of credit card contracts since al-
most their very beginning in the 1950s.85  These provisions were spearheaded 
by niche card providers (T&E cards), and employed during a period well before 
ubiquitous ownership and acceptance of general acceptance payment cards and 
well before it could be reasonably argued that payment card networks had any 
sort of market power. 
The original network agreements contained contractual restraints on both 
card surcharging as well as cash discounting.  In 1974, however, Consumers 
Union sued American Express and Bank AmeriCard, claiming that their no-
surcharge and no-discount rules violated antitrust law.86  American Express 
settled the suit two months later by agreeing to rescind its no-discount rule in 
order to allow merchants to offer cash discounts but continuing to bar card 
surcharges.87  According to Professor Levitin, Consumers Union reached sim-
ilar agreements with the other card networks at that time.88 
Since that time, public policy has followed an approach to discounting 
and surcharging that has consistently treated the one – discounting by mer-
chants – as permissible (if not desirable), and the other – surcharging by mer-
chants – as suspect, at best.  Thus, later in 1974, Congress amended the Truth 
 
 84. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 85. See Levitin, supra note 18, at 1372–75. 
 86. Id. at 1379. 
 87. Id. at 1379–80. 
 88. Id. at 1380. 
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in Lending Act to require that merchants be permitted to offer cash discounts 
(of up to five percent) but did not address surcharges.89  In 1976, Congress 
passed additional federal legislation that did prohibit surcharging, although the 
law provided that it would automatically sunset in three years.90  Nevertheless, 
in 1978, Congress renewed the surcharge ban for an additional three years but 
then let it lapse in 1981.91  That same year, however, Congress passed the Cash 
Discount Act, which eliminated the five percent cap on allowable cash dis-
counts and extended the anti-surcharge rule for yet another three years.92  At 
the time, Congress justified the continued ban on surcharging as an appropriate 
means of consumer protection aimed against the confusion and deception aris-
ing from merchants’ frequent use of “bait-and-switch” tactics: essentially, post-
ing one price on the shelf and then surprising customers with a higher price at 
the checkout register.93  The Senate Committee Report in support of the Cash 
Discount Act noted: 
[P]ermitting unlimited cash discounts and prohibiting surcharges allows 
the competitive free market to operate.  Merchants can utilize two-tier 
pricing systems and thereby price cash purchases lower than credit pur-
chases, if they choose to do so. 
But, they cannot implement two-tier pricing systems which deceive 
or mislead the consumer.  By permitting only cash discounts, the Com-
mittee intends to assure that consumers will be seeing at least the high-
est possible price they will have to pay when they see a tagged or posted 
price.  In other words, consumers cannot be lured into an establishment 
on the basis of the ‘low, rock-bottom price’ only to find at the cash reg-
ister that the price will be higher if a credit card is used.94 
Despite these expressed consumer protection concerns, however, Congress fi-
nally allowed the surcharge ban to lapse in 1984, and it has not been renewed 
by the federal government since.95 
But the disparate policy treatment of surcharging and discounting still 
persists.  Since 1984, federal law has continued to prohibit state and private 
restrictions on cash discounts but not to limit the power of states to ban or limit 
surcharging and not to impose any limits on private, contractual restrictions on 
surcharging.96  Thus, in the wake of the lapse of the federal ban on surcharging, 
approximately a dozen states enacted state statutory bans on the practice, in-
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1380–81. 
 91. Id. at 1381. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1383. 
 94. S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 4 (1981). 
 95. See Levitin, supra note 18, at 1381. 
 96. Id. 
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cluding many of the country’s most populous states, such as New York, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Massachusetts, and Texas.97  As long as the private, contractual 
restrictions remained in place these state laws were largely symbolic and, in 
practice, redundant of the terms of the agreements between the card networks 
and merchants. 
But the situation changed in 2013 when Visa and MasterCard entered into 
an antitrust class action settlement in a case brought by merchants challenging, 
among other things, the contractual prohibition on surcharging.98  As a result 
of the settlement, merchants were permitted to surcharge, although subject to 
limits.99  In 2016, however, a federal circuit court rejected the class action set-
tlement, leaving the current status of the litigation, and thus the network con-
tractual restrictions, in a state of uncertainty.100 
Significant for purposes of this article, as the antitrust settlements elimi-
nated contractual limits on surcharging, the dormant state law prohibitions on 
surcharging have become relevant for the first time in decades.  As a result, 
merchant plaintiffs brought suit in several courts around the country challeng-
ing the state laws in Florida, New York, Texas, and California. 
As noted, the primary complaint in these cases arises under the First 
Amendment and asserts that laws permitting merchants to offer “cash dis-
counts” but not to offer “credit surcharges” impermissibly restrain commercial 
speech.101  In response, the states and the courts that have upheld the laws argue 
that the laws do not limit speech but actually limit conduct – the action of im-
posing a monetary surcharge on a consumer who desires to use a payment 
card.102  In this view, the mere label distinguishing between a cash discount 
and a surcharge is incidental; rather it is the action of charging consumers more 
 
 97. Id. at 1381 n.215 (citing statutes from California, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas, which ban sur-
charging, and statutes from Minnesota and New Hampshire, which ban or limit sur-
charges).  In many states these bans provide minor exceptions, such as allowing gov-
ernment agencies or public utilities to impose surcharges.  See id.  The legislative his-
tory to these proposals suggests that these laws were lobbied for by the credit card 
industry and lobbied against by merchants with both parties insisting that they were the 
“true” voice of the consumers, just as the current litigation by the merchants is purport-
edly justified as benefiting consumers.  See id. at 1381 n.216.  That consumers them-
selves did not participate on either side of the debate, or on either side of the current 
litigation, is hardly surprising in light of standard public choice theory, which predicts 
that result by consumers.  See id. 
 98. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. 
Supp. 2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d and vacated, 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 99. Id. at 217. 
 100. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 
223, 231 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 101. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 128–30 (2d Cir. 
2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 102. See id. at 131. 
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than the posted (cash) price once they reach the point of sale (when consumers 
use cards) that is forbidden.103 
The Supreme Court, however, held that “[w]hat the law does regulate is 
how sellers may communicate their prices,”104 even though it also “regulates a 
relationship between a sticker price and the price charged to credit card us-
ers.”105  On remand to the Second Circuit the portion of the law upon which 
the Court ruled will be reviewed as a regulation affecting commercial speech 
and assessed for its constitutionality under the First Amendment.106 
Interesting as they may be, the First Amendment issues per se are not the 
focus of this paper – although to the extent that the First Amendment arguments 
rest on the BLE claims that are this paper’s focus, they are implicated here. 
In the next section, we examine the underlying BLE claims that have been 
advanced in the cases and the extent to which they have been accepted – largely 
uncritically – by the courts.  We then turn to an examination of the validity of 
those arguments. 
III. DISCOUNTING V. SURCHARGING: THE PATH TO THE SUPREME 
COURT 
The constitutionality of the challenged New York State no-surcharge law 
will be determined on remand by the Second Circuit following the Court’s 
holding that, at least with respect to its specific application in the case, the law 
regulates commercial speech.  Although the Court did not consider them, the 
merchants’ First Amendment claims rest in part on concepts and conclusions 
drawn from BLE.  This section reviews the BLE arguments made in Expres-
sions Hair Design, as well as other BLE arguments and evidence regarding 
surcharging and discounting of card payments. 
A. BLE Arguments for Why Merchants Should Be Allowed to Of-
fer Surcharges 
In both the lower courts and the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in sur-
charge-challenge cases have relied in important respects on BLE arguments.  
At the core of these arguments is the theoretical truism that a discount for non-
card transactions can be mathematically equivalent to a surcharge on card 
transactions.  Thus, a simplistic glance at the practice of surcharging would 
seem to suggest that a merchant (or consumer) should be indifferent between 
whether a certain price is labeled as a basic price with an ex post “surcharge” 
attached or as a different (presumably higher) price with an ex post “discount” 
applied. 
 
 103. See id. 
 104. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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But, according to the BLE argument in favor of surcharging, people re-
spond differently to discounts and surcharges because of the way they are 
framed.  The basic argument is summarized in the BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus: 
Under traditional economic theory, the market impact of a “cash dis-
count” should be the same as the impact of a “surcharge.”  Credit card 
customers pay more, and cash customers pay less, regardless of the la-
bel attached.  We would thus expect the promise of a cash discount to 
induce consumers to forego paying with their credit cards to the same 
extent penalizing them with a surcharge would do so.  After all, sur-
charges and cash discounts are just two ways of conveying identical 
information about the relationship between two prices. 
But pioneering work in the field of behavioral economics teaches 
that people do not make decisions based strictly on rational calculations.  
Instead, their decisions can be highly influenced by the manner in which 
information is presented: a perceived reward garners a minor, positive 
reaction, while a perceived penalty produces a strong, negative reaction.  
In this way, framing is a material part of any communication. 
In the context of credit card surcharging, behavioral economics has 
shown that consumers react very differently to discounts and sur-
charges.  A discount is perceived as a “reward” for a cash purchase, 
generating a mild, positive reaction.  A surcharge is perceived as a “pen-
alty” for a credit purchase, garnering a much stronger, negative reac-
tion.  In this way, a merchant’s ability to incentivize use of a preferred 
payment method is diminished by the limits no-surcharge laws place on 
the way the merchants describe the price differential.107 
The BLE scholars’ argument rests on the BE theory of the “framing effect,” 
which “reflects the fact that people will reach different decisions depending on 
the way information is presented, despite the fact that the information presented 
is not substantively altered by its presentation.”108 
Additionally, the BLE brief argues that consumers suffer from a “loss-
aversion bias,” which leads them to respond more strongly to transactions 
framed as “losses” as opposed to those framed as “gains.”109  As a result, so 
the argument goes, consumers will respond more dramatically to a surcharge 
on credit cards – which is “framed” for consumers as an extra charge incurred 
during checkout – whereas a discount garners a less intense response because 
it is perceived as a gain.110  The brief references psychologist Daniel Kahneman  
 107. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 2–3.  As noted above, the brief 
does not actually present BE analysis on behalf of BE scholars but actually presents a 
BLE analysis first propounded by legal scholar Adam J. Levitin on behalf of a group of 
BLE scholars.  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 108. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 6. 
 109. Id. at 11. 
 110. Id. at 11–12. 
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for the proposition that “people will more readily forgo a discount than pay a 
surcharge.  The two may be economically equivalent, but they are not emo-
tionally equivalent.”111 
Kahneman’s comment, however, is entirely conclusory as it applies to the 
specific issue of credit card surcharging, and he cites no empirical support for 
his claim.112  Instead, he relies on a thirty-six-year-old economics journal arti-
cle by Richard Thaler113 – who likewise provided no empirical support for his 
claim but merely speculated that credit card issuers opposed surcharges more 
staunchly than cash discounts because consumers would react more adversely 
to out-of-pocket costs.  The entirety of Thaler’s argument and support for the 
proposition is as follows: 
Other kinds of evidence in support of the endowment effect hypoth-
esis are less direct but perhaps more convincing.  I refer to instances in 
which businesses have used the endowment effect to further their inter-
ests. 
Credit cards provide a particularly clear example.  Until recently, 
credit card companies banned their affiliated stores from charging 
higher prices to credit card users.  A bill to outlaw such agreements was 
presented to Congress.  When it appeared likely that some kind of bill 
would pass, the credit card lobby turned its attention to form rather than 
substance.  Specifically, it preferred that any difference between cash 
and credit card customers take the form of a cash discount rather than a 
credit card surcharge.  This preference makes sense if consumers would 
view the cash discount as an opportunity cost of using the credit card 
but the surcharge as an out-of-pocket cost.114 
Kahneman and Thaler’s evidence-free analysis is unfortunately charac-
teristic of a good deal of BLE – a scholarly methodology that one of us has 
elsewhere characterized as a “just-so stories” approach to academic research.115  
 
 111. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 364 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 112. See id. 
 113. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980). 
 114. Id. at 45.  Thaler does cite to congressional testimony from a Federal Reserve 
Board member who asserts that “critics argued that a surcharge carries the connotation 
of a penalty on credit card users while a discount is viewed as a bonus to cash custom-
ers.  They contended that this difference in psychological impact makes it more likely 
that surcharge systems will discourage customers from using credit cards.”  Id. at 45 
n.6. 
 115. See generally Zywicki, Just-So Stories, supra note 68.  It should be empha-
sized here that the criticisms that follow are primarily directed toward the project of 
behavioral law and economics, i.e., the effort to apply behavioral economics concepts 
to particular policy questions, not the underlying study of behavioral economics.  Alt-
hough many problems have been identified with that literature as well, including the 
problem of just-so storytelling, addressing those debates is beyond the scope of this 
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The standard methodological technique is to construct a well-specified hypoth-
esis and then gather data to test it.  The “just-so stories” approach to behavioral 
law and economics, by contrast, begins with a data point – a casually observed 
behavior that it seeks to explain, for example, that credit card issuers were more 
opposed to surcharges than discounts –  and cherry-picks from a list of behav-
ioral biases to identify a few that supposedly “explain” the observed behavior.  
And researchers have identified well in excess of 100 different cognitive biases 
that supposedly apply in a variety of contexts, many of which contradict one 
another and all of which provide material to selectively prove or disprove vir-
tually any proposition.116 
It is possible to use behavioral economics to “explain” both sides of the 
same argument when examining why consumers “irrationally” select either 
fixed-rate or adjustable-rate home mortgages, for example, or why they take 
mortgages either with or without prepayment penalties.117  Indeed, even when 
confronted with evidence that rebuts their initial hypothesis, some BLE theo-
rists will simply retroactively redefine their original hypothesis to accord with 
their initial prediction.118  Moreover, as noted above, every BLE prediction to 
date, at least as applied to consumer finance, has been rejected when tested 
empirically.119 
Unlike Thaler and Kahneman, however, who simply speculate in an off-
hand fashion about surcharging, the brief of the behavioral economists support-
ing certiorari in Expressions Hair Design offers some empirical evidence in 
support of its claim.  Thus the brief cites to the results of a Dutch survey – 
where consumers expressed a “very negative reaction to surcharges (seventy-
four percent of respondents deemed them as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’), but not an 
especially positive reaction to cash discounts (only twenty-two percent viewed 
them as ‘good’ or ‘very good’)”120 –  in support of the “framing effect” and the 
claim that surcharging is more effective at altering consumer behavior than is 
 
Article.  We take as given the existence of the supposed biases that have been identified 
and focus instead on the effort to apply them to real-world contexts.  Behavioral eco-
nomics is at least interesting, whether its claims are descriptively accurate or not.  But 
as another of us has elsewhere noted of BE, “[i]nteresting doesn’t necessarily mean 
policy relevant.”  Geoffrey A. Manne, Geoffrey Manne on Interesting Doesn’t Neces-
sarily Mean Policy Relevant, TRUTH ON MARKET (Dec. 6, 2010), https://truthonthemar-
ket.com/2010/12/06/geoffrey-manne-on-interesting-doesnt-necessarily-mean-policy-
relevant/. 
 116. See, e.g., List of Cognitive Biases, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). 
 117. See Zywicki, Just-So Stories, supra note 68, at 168–171, 195–98. 
 118. See Durkin, Elliehausen & Zywicki, supra note 61, at 35. 
 119. See supra notes 61–68. 
 120. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 12 (citing E. VIS & J. TOTH, THE 
ABOLITION OF THE NO-DISCRIMINATION RULE 12 (2000), http://www.cred-
itslips.org/files/netherlands-no-discrimination-rule-study.pdf [hereinafter VIS & 
TOTH]). 
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cash discounting.121  The brief also refers to an internal study performed by 
furniture retailer IKEA which suggested that surcharging credit cards results in 
their decreased usage.122  And the BE Scholars Merits Amicus adds a descrip-
tion of an additional survey, conducted for purposes of the brief, on consumer 
behavior in response to surcharging/discounting.123 
As we discuss below, not only is this scant evidence, but on many critical 
points the studies do not support the argument as framed.  In fact, when fully 
and fairly analyzed, the studies actually reject the argument.  We also offer 
additional evidence below that further undermines the BLE arguments in the 
brief. 
Despite the weak and speculative nature of the analysis and evidence pro-
vided, however, several federal circuit and district courts have tacitly accepted 
these arguments.124  And although the Supreme Court refrained from relying 
upon these theories, the plaintiffs will undoubtedly press the Second Circuit to 
apply them in its ruling on the constitutionality of New York’s no-surcharge 
law. 
In the following section, we provide a brief survey of how lower courts 
have treated the BLE arguments in the challenges to state anti-surcharge laws 
in New York, Texas, California, and Florida – an exercise that sheds further 
light on the nature of the assertions and their place in the policy arguments for 
which they are offered. 
B. Behavioral Economics and Surcharging in the Lower Courts 
The BLE arguments, relying upon the interest revealed by the judiciary 
in lower court opinions, form an important part of the plaintiffs’ arguments 
before the Supreme Court.  As the BLE Cert. Amicus notes, “Amici believe 
that this case – which concerns the significance of the framing effect under the 
First Amendment – presents the first petition for certiorari based squarely on 
behavioral economic theory.”125 
Although several lower courts ignored the BLE arguments in their rul-
ings, BLE arguments figure prominently in several of the opinions.126  Even 
the Second Circuit, which upheld the New York Statute in Expressions Hair 
Design, uncritically cited the arguments.127 
 
 121. See Levitin, supra note 18, at 1351–52. 
 122. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18 (citing Scott Schuh et al., An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the 2010 Proposed Settlement Between the Department of Justice 
and Credit Card Networks 26–27 (Fed. Res. Bank of  Bos. Pub. Pol’y Discussion Pa-
pers No. 11-4, 2011), http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ppdp1104.pdf.). 
 123. See BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 9–11. 
 124. See infra Behavioral Economics and Surcharging in the Lower Courts. 
 125. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 1. 
 126. See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1203–05 (E.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
 127. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 122–23, 144 (2d 
Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
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But before arriving at the Second Circuit, the BLE arguments were cited 
in support of Judge Rakoff’s decision to enjoin New York’s surcharge law in 
the Southern District of New York. He wrote, “A number of studies have indi-
cated . . . that consumers perceive credit-card surcharges negatively as a kind 
of loss or penalty, while cash discounts are perceived positively as a kind of 
gain or bonus.”128  He added that “[p]laintiffs . . . want to impose credit card 
surcharges, rather than give cash discounts, and to so inform their customers, 
precisely because consumers are more likely then to notice the fees, dislike 
them, and switch to cash in order to avoid them.”129 
Judge Rakoff also claimed that the inability to surcharge credit cards re-
sults in a regressive wealth transfer as surcharge bans “in effect force cash users 
(who are said to be disproportionately poor and minority persons), to subsidize 
the retail purchases of credit card users.”130  We have discussed that claim else-
where and will not revisit that discussion in detail here,131 although, as we dis-
cuss below, surcharging itself affects a wealth transfer that is ignored by oppo-
nents of the state law bans.132 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the Southern District of New York 
on the grounds that the New York law prohibited only certain conduct (impo-
sition of a surcharge) and that the law was not a limitation on commercial 
speech.133  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit approvingly cited behavioral eco-
nomics studies that supposedly demonstrated that surcharging is more effective 
than cash discounts at changing consumer payment choices.134 
According to the Second Circuit: “One difference between credit-card 
surcharges and cash discounts involves consumers’ reactions to them.  A psy-
chological phenomenon known as ‘loss aversion’ means that ‘changes that 
make things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains’ of an 
equivalent amount.”135  “For this reason,” the court agreed, “credit-card sur-
charges are more effective than cash discounts at discouraging credit-card use 
among consumers, which has naturally led credit-card companies to oppose 
them.”136 
 
 128. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 193, 199 (1991); Levitin, supra note 13, at 280–81; S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 3 
(1981)), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 129. Id. at 437. 
 130. Id. 
 131. For a discussion of the claim of regressive wealth transfer from low-income to 
high-income consumers as a result of payment card usage see LEE, MANNE, MORRIS & 
ZYWICKI, supra note 79, at 26–33. 
 132. See infra notes 138–140. 
 133. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 
2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 134. Id. at 122. 
 135. Id. (quoting Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 128, at 199). 
 136. Id. (citing Thaler, supra note 113, at 45).  
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But as the court noted (still citing the BE literature): 
In fact, consumers react negatively to credit-card surcharges not be-
cause surcharges “communicate” any particular “message,” but because 
consumers dislike being charged extra.  See [Kahneman, Knetsch & 
Thaler, supra note 127, at 199] (“[C]hanges that make things worse 
(losses) loom larger than improvements or gains.”).  If a consumer 
thinks, based on a seller’s sticker price, that she will be paying $100 for 
the seller’s goods or services, then she will be annoyed if it turns out 
that she actually has to pay $103 simply because she has chosen to use 
a credit card; by contrast, if the sticker price is $103, she will be less 
annoyed by having to pay $103, even if cash customers only have to 
pay $100.  Nothing about the consumer’s reaction in either situation 
turns on any words uttered by the seller.  And although the difference 
in the consumer’s reaction to the two pricing schemes may be puzzling 
purely as an economic matter, we are aware of no authority suggesting 
that the First Amendment prevents states from protecting consumers 
against irrational psychological annoyances.137 
On the other hand, the court also acknowledged that anti-surcharge laws could 
protect consumers from abusive merchant surcharging practices: 
According to proponents of prohibitions on credit-card surcharges, 
experience also suggests that such surcharges will tend to exceed the 
amount necessary for the seller to recoup its swipe fees, meaning that 
sellers will effectively be able to extract windfall profits from credit-
card users.  By contrast, cash discounts are unlikely to lead to the same 
problem, because merchants will not set the amount of the discount 
higher than the marginal cost of credit.138 
Other courts have followed a similar pattern.  The Eastern District of Cal-
ifornia also referred to BLE arguments in support of its opinion striking down 
the California surcharge law.139  In reaching its holding, the court observed that 
Retailers would like to emphasize that the higher price is a surcharge 
because behavioral economics research has shown that customers are 
“loss averse” and a potential economic penalty will motivate them to 
change their behavior more than a potential economic benefit.  See gen-
erally [Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 128, at 199; Levitin, 
supra note 13, at 280–81].  It follows, Plaintiffs reason, that the most 
effective way to encourage customers to switch from credit cards to 
 
 137. Id. at 132–33 (second alteration in original). 
 138. Id. at 123 (footnote omitted). 
 139. See Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 2015).  
This case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit but was stayed pending resolution of the 
Supreme Court case in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman.  See Italian Colors 
Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, appeal docketed, No. 15-15873 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2015). 
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cash payments is to emphasize an economic penalty associated with the 
use of credit cards.140 
The court then contended that this means the inability to surcharge credit card 
payments results in a regressive wealth transfer from low-income cash users to 
higher-income card payers.141 
In support of the BLE-based arguments, these courts rely on only a small 
handful of BLE sources, none of which offers empirical support for the claims.  
Richard Thaler’s article, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, is the 
most consistently cited.142  As noted above, however, Thaler’s article provides 
no evidence for his claim.  Two of the cases143 cite a subsequent literature re-
view article co-authored by Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Thaler: 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.144  Yet 
that article provides no new, relevant evidence or analysis and merely cites 
Thaler’s earlier article without elaboration, asserting inaccurately that Thaler’s 
earlier article “explains why firms that charge cash customers one price and 
credit card customers a higher price always refer to the cash price as a discount 
rather than to the credit card price as a surcharge.”145  Thaler’s article, of 
course, “explains” nothing but merely provides one supposition for the obser-
vation without any consideration or refutation of alternative hypotheses as to 
why consumers and card issuers might be more hostile toward credit card sur-
charges than cash discounts. 
Finally, the opinion for the Southern District of New York146 provides an 
additional citation to a 1990 article by Professor Edmund Kitch.147  Professor 
Kitch’s article also adds no new support for the claim but merely refers to Tha-
ler’s “casual attempt to explain this puzzle” of credit card companies’ prefer-
ence for cash discounts instead of surcharges.148 
 
 140. Id. at 1204. 
 141. Id. at 1205.  The court also noted that the ability to impose surcharges may 
also lead to greater competition over interchange fees, which could put downward pres-
sure on interchange fees over time.  Id.  Although this may be true, it is not necessarily 
relevant to the underlying question of whether consumers will actually benefit overall 
from the imposition of surcharges – and is neither in the ambit of behavioral economics, 
nor properly before the court, as economic policy is a matter for legislatures to deter-
mine. 
 142. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 122. 
 143. Id.; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1204. 
 144. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 128, at 193. 
 145. Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
 146. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 438 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017). 
 147. Edmund W. Kitch, The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card 
Issuer Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 217 (1990). 
 148. Id. at 218. 
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Overall, the lower court decisions that discuss and rely on BLE arguments 
do not add any further evidence to support those claims.  The courts that have 
struck down state surcharge bans, however, consistently accept the BLE-
derived assertions that the only relevant distinction between a surcharge and a 
discount is a rhetorical one and that the preference for surcharging stems from 
an effect wholly attributable to the psychological effect of the label and not the 
underlying conduct.149 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS CLAIMS 
ON DISCOUNTING AND SURCHARGES 
Accepting for a moment the characterization of the choice between sur-
charging and discounting as solely a matter of rhetoric, rather than substance, 
the BLE argument in support of permitting merchants to surcharge rests fun-
damentally on the claim that a surcharge label is more effective than a discount 
label in altering consumer behavior. 
Moreover, the argument asserts as a corollary that, because surcharges 
supposedly steer more consumers away from credit card use to alternative pay-
ment mechanisms (such as cash or store-branded credit cards), credit card net-
works and issuers are more strongly averse to allowing surcharges than dis-
counts.  Thus, BLE scholars and the courts that have accepted their claims also 
aver that helping card networks and issuers is the real reason for no-surcharge 
laws and that the traditional asserted state interest in prohibiting surcharging 
(protecting consumers from misleading pricing practices or opportunistic 
holdup) is insincere. 
Upon closer examination, however, it must be concluded that the BLE 
argument that surcharging is more effective at changing consumer behavior 
than is cash discounting is fundamentally unsupported by available evidence.  
This suggests that the insistence by some merchants on being permitted to sur-
charge credit cards must be explained by some other dynamic, which we dis-
cuss below.  That discussion also thus challenges the corollary assertion that 
the proffered consumer protection interest in surcharge bans is baseless. 
A. The Evidence “Supporting” BLE Claims 
1. Consumers Dislike Surcharging More Than They Like Discount-
ing: The Dutch Study 
The assertion that surcharging is “more effective” than cash discounting 
rests on scant empirical evidence.  The first of these is a survey of Dutch con-
sumers, in which, it is claimed, consumers had a stronger negative reaction to 
surcharging than they had a positive reaction to cash discounting.  In the study, 
seventy-four percent of subjects expressed a negative view when “merchants 
are allowed to ask for a fee when consumers want to pay with their payment  
 149. See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
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card” (i.e., surcharging), whereas only twenty-one percent expressed a positive 
opinion about “giving a discount when paying with other means.”150 
Yet simply because some respondents express an opinion that they dislike 
surcharging does not necessarily mean that surcharging will be more effective 
at changing consumer behavior.  It hardly seems surprising that consumers 
would find it objectionable for retailers to post one price on the shelf and then 
surprise the consumer with a higher price at the register.  In other words, the 
expression of dislike for surcharging plausibly reflects a dislike for sharp busi-
ness practices designed to conceal the true full price of the goods from con-
sumers, rather than a dislike of surcharging per se.  As the Second Circuit noted 
in Expressions Hair Design: “If a consumer thinks, based on a seller’s sticker 
price, that she will be paying $100 for the seller’s goods or services, then she 
will be annoyed if it turns out that she actually has to pay $103 simply because 
she has chosen to use a credit card.”151  Nor does the mere fact that a consumer 
is “annoyed” by being forced to pay a higher price for using a credit card in-
herently demonstrate that the reason for the annoyance is some supposed con-
sumer bias as opposed to, say, an expression of distaste for sharp dealing and 
bait-and-switch sales tactics.  And, importantly, without more, the fact that a 
consumer happens to be “annoyed” by a particular merchant practice says noth-
ing about whether consumers will nevertheless accept the additional charge in 
order to pay with credit anyway or switch to cash in order to avoid it. 
Moreover, merely asking consumers whether they have a negative opin-
ion of surcharging fails to distinguish between answers based on the theory of 
surcharging versus consumers’ actual experience with it in practice.  But this 
distinction is crucial to understanding the nature of consumers’ conduct – as 
well as the plausibility of the state’s interest in restricting the use of surcharg-
ing. 
As discussed in detail below, in virtually every country where surcharging 
has been authorized by law, merchants have routinely been criticized for ex-
cessive surcharging and for inadequate disclosure of surcharging practices.152  
Given the documented propensity of merchants in many industries around the 
world to engage in these behaviors, the adverse reaction to surcharging might 
well reflect consumers’ adverse experience with abusive surcharging practices, 
not a hypothetical aversion to the concept of surcharging per se.153  This dis-
 
 150. VIS & TOTH, supra note 120, at 11. 
 151. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 133 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 152. See discussion at infra notes 221–30, 287–94. 
 153. The survey of Dutch consumers did not ask survey respondents whether they 
thought that the surcharges that they had been offered were adequately disclosed and 
whether they thought that they were proportional to the underlying cost.  See generally 
VIS & TOTH, supra note 120.  On the other hand, other researchers have in fact found 
that Dutch merchants routinely surcharge at rates that substantially exceed the actual 
cost differential between cash and credit payments.  See generally Wilko Bolt, Nicole 
Jonker & Corry van Renselaar, Incentives at the Counter: An Empirical Analysis of 
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tinction is critical because it undermines the BLE hypothesis that a psycholog-
ical quirk explains consumers’ aversion to surcharging and offers a more plau-
sible explanation that they simply do not like being taken advantage of. 
Further, consumers’ reactions to the questions posed in the Dutch study 
may not reflect the psychological dynamic suggested by BLE: Most cardhold-
ers in Holland already pay an annual fee for their cards (usually about EUR 
34).154  Thus, many cardholders might justifiably feel like they have already 
paid for their share of the cost of operating the credit card network, that doing 
so should give them full access to the network, and that the merchant is simply 
acting opportunistically to impose still more costs of operating the payments 
network on the consumer, or to appropriate some of the cardholders’ expected 
value from participating in the network. 
More fundamentally, however, and as discussed below,155 whether con-
sumers approve of credit card surcharging in the abstract does not actually de-
termine how they behave nor whether surcharging is more effective than cash 
discounts at altering consumer behavior.  Instead, despite their apparent ex-
pressed aversion to surcharging, they nevertheless regularly pay surcharges – 
presumably when the cost of avoiding them is greater than the cost of simply 
paying. 
2. The IKEA Non-Study 
The BLE brief also offers the experience of Swedish furniture discounter 
IKEA to support the claim that surcharging leads to decreased credit card us-
age.156  According to IKEA, in 2004 it experimented with imposing a surcharge 
of a fixed 0.7£ on credit card payments in its United Kingdom stores, which 
resulted in a thirty-seven percent migration of credit card transactions to 
debit.157  In a separate experiment in 2010, in the United States, IKEA provided 
customers who used PIN debit a three percent price discount on their next trip 
 
Surcharging Card Payments and Payment Behaviour in the Netherlands, 34 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1738 (2010).  These findings lend support to the possibility that the 
actual experience of Dutch consumers with credit card surcharges is one of price goug-
ing, rather than a legitimate effort to recoup merchant costs.  See id. at 1740.  The 
ubiquity of the practice of above-cost surcharging is discussed in greater detail below 
and likely explains much of both the merchant enthusiasm for being allowed to impose 
surcharges and the consumer opposition thereto.  See infra A Further Note on Patterns 
of Abusive Surcharging; The Effects on Regulation. 
 154. See Bolt, Jonker & van Renselaar, supra note 153, at 1739–40. 
 155. See infra Actually, Discounting Seems to Be More Effective: The Dutch 
Study, Redux. 
 156. IKEA’s findings are reported in Schuh et al., supra note 122, at 26–27.  As 
will be discussed, it is highly misleading to refer to the IKEA findings as a “study” in 
light of the lack of any effort to provide any sort of experimental controls in any fashion. 
 157. Id. at 27. 
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to IKEA – thus providing no discount on the current purchase.158  Unsurpris-
ingly, this offer proved less effective than the United Kingdom surcharge ex-
periment, resulting in only nine percent of consumers opting for PIN debit in-
stead of credit or signature debit.159 
It is neither surprising nor particularly relevant to the underlying question 
presented by the surcharging cases that imposing a cost on the use of a partic-
ular payment device led some consumers to switch to alternative payment.  In-
creasing the price of a good or service – in this case, by surcharging credit card 
transactions – will always decrease demand at the margin.  At the same time, 
it is equally obvious that providing a discount will result in some increased 
demand for use of the discounted product.  In order for these predictable results 
to have any bearing on the “surcharging has a greater effect on consumer con-
duct” claim presented by those challenging state no-surcharge laws, however, 
evaluation of the relative effectiveness of these different practices is required. 
But the IKEA experiment provides little evidence on the pertinent ques-
tion of whether surcharging or discounting is more effective at leading con-
sumers to change payment methods.160 
As Shuh, et al. observed, with perhaps unintended understatement, of the 
IKEA experiment: “The surcharge and discount results are not exactly compa-
rable because of the different countries and time periods”; yet, inexplicably, 
they nevertheless conclude that “[the findings] generally support the notion that 
consumers respond more to surcharges than to discounts.”161 
In fact, the results are not remotely comparable.  Not only are they sepa-
rated by six years (including in the interim, among other things, several elec-
tions and a massive worldwide financial crisis), as well as an ocean, they follow 
from entirely different sorts of conduct.  While the surcharge was imposed im-
mediately and at a fixed price, the discount was paid after an indefinite time (if 
at all), following an additional transaction, and in an amount dependent on the 
size of the subsequent transaction.162  There is simply no way to tell from the 
evidence available whether comparable surcharges and discounts would have 
elicited the same or even similar responses; here, the threatened surcharge and 
offered discount almost certainly had wildly divergent (and, in the case of the 
discount, entirely indeterminate) expected values to consumers.  All we can tell 
is the direction of the effects – but, as noted, no one needed these IKEA exper-
iments to know that demand curves slope downward.  We have simply no way 
of knowing whether the relative magnitude of the effects was in any way dif-
ferent because of a so-called irrational “framing bias.”  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that even nine percent of consumers saw 
this as a valuable offer to gain a modest three percent discount in a future trip, especially 
if the consumer would otherwise earn rewards from using his or her credit or signature 
debit card on his or her current trip. 
 160. The following is based on the summary of the IKEA presentation provided by 
Schuh et al. 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. See id. 
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3. The Experiment of the Behavioral Economics Scholars 
At the merits stage of the Supreme Court case in Expressions Hair De-
sign, a new piece of evidence was introduced into the case for the first time: a 
brand new behavioral economics survey conducted by a BE Scholar specifi-
cally for the litigation, a summary of which was submitted to the Court as part 
of an amicus brief on behalf of a group of BE scholars.  The behavioral econ-
omists argue that the experiment demonstrates that surcharging is more effec-
tive at changing consumer behavior regarding credit cards than cash discount-
ing.163 
In fact, the study unintentionally illustrates the problematic nature of de-
vising policy – much less constitutional doctrine – on the unsteady sands of 
behavioral economics.  In particular, the study and the implications drawn from 
it show the limits of trying to draw inferences about consumer behavior in real-
world contexts from the artificial and often unrealistic context of laboratory 
experiments and surveys. 
In the study, the economists used Amazon Turk to recruit 800 partici-
pants.164  The participants were assigned to one of two groups and asked to fill 
out a survey.  Each participant was told to “imagine” that they had a credit card 
and were confronted with one of two possible scenarios. 
Those assigned to the credit-card-surcharge group were presented 
with the following scenario: 
Imagine that you have a credit card and $220 in cash in your wal-
let/purse.  You buy food at a convenience store. 
The salesperson says it costs $130 if you pay with cash (regular price). 
If you pay by credit card, there would be a surcharge (an additional fee) 
of around 3%.  If you pay with a credit card, the total cost would be 
$133.90. 
Would you pay by credit card or pay with the $220 in your wallet/purse? 
Those assigned to the cash discount group were presented with the 
following scenario: 
Imagine that you have a credit card and $220 in cash in your wal-
let/purse. You buy food at a convenience store. 
The salesperson says it costs $133.90 if you pay with credit card (regu-
lar price). If you pay with cash, there would be a discount (reduction in 
 
 163. See BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 9–11 (summarizing survey 
results). 
 164. Todd Rogers, Surcharges and Discounts Study, OPEN SCI. FRAMEWORK 
(2016), https://osf.io/brm6u/ (experimental design and protocol). 
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price) of around 3%.  If you pay with cash, the total cost would be 
$130.00. 
Would you pay by credit card or pay with the $220 in your wal-
let/purse?165 
The BE Scholars report that the results supposedly 
were strikingly consistent with prospect theory’s predictions, and with 
the prior research discussed above.  Of those assigned to the credit-card 
surcharge group, 11% chose to pay with credit card.  Of those assigned 
to the cash discount group, 18% chose to pay with credit card.  Put dif-
ferently, describing the price differential in terms of a credit-card sur-
charge reduced preferences to use a credit card by more than one-third 
relative to describing the price differential as a cash discount.166 
As an initial matter, it is not clear what the authors mean when they claim that 
their findings are consistent “with the prior research discussed above”;167 their 
brief cites the finding from the Vis & Toth study that consumers “have a 
strongly negative reaction to surcharges but not an especially positive reaction 
to cash discounts.”168  But they fail to address or even acknowledge the central 
finding of that study, which suggests that cash discounting is actually more 
effective than surcharging at altering consumer behavior.169  Additionally, 
they, yet again, cite Thaler’s speculations in his 1980 article.170  As we have 
discussed, however, that study presents no actual “research.”171 
The authors do cite a number of other studies on topics such as teacher 
compensation, putting by professional golfers, and general incentives with re-
spect to using credit cards,172 none of which appears to have direct relevance 
to how consumers will respond to surcharging versus discounting and, as dis-
cussed below, might actually suggest that surcharging makes consumers worse 
off. 
More important, however, the study itself provides a warning to courts 
about the potential pitfalls of basing policy and constitutional doctrine on ex-
periments such as the one described in the BLE Scholars’ amicus brief. 
A notable red-flag is the extraordinarily – and unrealistically – high per-
centage of participants in the study who claim that they would switch from 
 
 165. BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 10. 
 166. Id. at 10–11. 
 167. Id. at 10. 
 168. Id. at 8 (citing VIS & TOTH, supra note 120, at 12). 
 169. See id.; see also supra notes 119–22. 
 170. BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 8. 
 171. See supra notes 113–14. 
 172. BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
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credit to cash under either “framing” of the communication: eighty-nine per-
cent with the surcharge and eighty-two percent with the cash discount.173  Alt-
hough the experimenters report that the differences between the two groups are 
statistically significant, they never pause to consider the realism of those find-
ings and the inferences that can be drawn from them. 
To put the matter bluntly, the notion that more than eighty percent of con-
sumers will switch from credit to cash in the face of a three percent price dif-
ferential is utterly fanciful, regardless of how it is communicated.  Reviewing 
the various studies cited above, the best real-world evidence suggests that con-
sumers sometimes switch from credit to cash at rates ranging from as low as 
seven percent up to twenty-five percent or fifty percent174 – but no real-world 
study finds a rate of switching anywhere near eighty-two percent or eighty-
nine percent. 
The improbable diversion rates in the study likely reflect the unrealistic 
nature of the experimental design itself.  First, the study was conducted in a 
completely artificial, hypothetical environment, where the participant faces one 
discrete decision: to reject or accept a surcharge or discount.  In the real world, 
however, a consumer’s choice context is much more complicated, and consum-
ers are unlikely to be so focused on this one particular element of the transac-
tion.  The design does not ask consumers to consider the timing of the sur-
charge/discount, whether they have already shopped or would need to adjust 
their purchase in response to a new price, whether they might prefer to put 
some of their items back instead of accepting or rejecting the surcharge/dis-
count on all of their intended purchases, or how much it might cost them (in 
both time and fees), for example, to collect sufficient cash from a nearby 
ATM.175  These are all factors in real-world decisions, and none of them are 
reflected in the study’s stylized and unrealistic setting. 
A larger problem, however, is presented by the most strikingly unrealistic 
aspect of the survey’s design.  The experimenters tell the consumer to “imag-
ine” that he or she has $220 in cash and is contemplating a $130 purchase.  Yet 
the assumption that the consumer has $220 in cash is entirely arbitrary – and, 
more to the point, completely unrealistic.  According to a recent study based 
on data collected in the 2012 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, the median 
American consumer carries $22 in his wallet – a full order of magnitude less 
than postulated by the experiment – and only eight percent of Americans reg-
ularly carry $200 or more in their wallets.176 
Thus, a more realistic experimental hypothetical would be something like 
the following: “Assume that you have $22 [not $220] in your wallet and you 
 
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. See infra Actually, Discounting Seems to Be More Effective: The Dutch 
Study, Redux. 
 175. See BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 10. 
 176. GREENE & SCHUH, supra note 41, at 3.  Only twenty-two percent of U.S. con-
sumers carry even $100 in their wallets.  Id. at 9. 
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buy $130 in groceries at a convenience store.”  Under that more realistic fram-
ing, of course, we would expect to find a rate of substitution away from cards 
significantly less than eighty percent, as only the eight percent or so of U.S. 
consumers who carry more than $200 in their wallets would even be able to 
consider switching, along with some small portion of consumers willing and 
able to step out of line to retrieve cash from an ATM (which itself may charge 
a fee even larger than the amount of the hypothetical price differential). 
Under this more realistic scenario, it is easy to see how consumer welfare 
could be enhanced by prohibiting surcharging, even if cash discounting were 
still permitted.  If consumers have effectively locked themselves into using 
credit by the time they arrive at the register, a surcharge appears to be a purely 
opportunistic means of taking advantage of the situation.  A cash discount, on 
the other hand, at least provides those consumers who can take advantage of it 
with an unexpected benefit, rather than an unavoidable and unexpected fee, and 
leaves those who cannot take advantage of the discount no worse off than they 
would otherwise have been.177 
Experimental economics by its very nature requires researchers to deal in 
simplifications and to conjure up hypothetical scenarios.  But to the extent that 
researchers create unrealistic conditions for their experiments (such as telling 
participants to assume that they have ten times more cash in their wallets than 
they typically would), the implications that can be drawn for consumers mak-
ing decisions in a real-world context are extremely limited.178  Moreover, these  
 177. The imaginary scenario provided by the survey also ignores a potential addi-
tional problem that goes not to problems with the survey design but to the conclusions 
that can be drawn for consumer welfare.  The scenario provides information about the 
size of the surcharge (“around 3%”) but also calculates a conversion of that percentage 
figure into final dollar values ($130 versus $133.90).  In reality, however, many con-
sumers may be aware of a surcharge but will not find out how large it will actually be, 
nor how much it will amount to in actual dollars, until they check out.  This could 
potentially result in consumer confusion in comparing prices between competing offers 
at two stores if one offers a lower sticker price but adds a surcharge and the other offers 
a higher sticker price but no surcharge, which could result in a consumer choosing the 
more expensive offer.  Taking steps to prevent this sort of harmful confusion seems 
like a plausible state interest. 
 178. The limits of real-world implications drawn from laboratory experiments (to 
say nothing of the sort of survey used here, which is even more attenuated than an actual 
experiment) are well-known.  For example, the best known of the behavioral economics 
effects – the endowment effect – has been consistently whittled away by studies that 
have introduced more realism into the initial experiments’ stylized settings.  See, e.g., 
Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Econom-
ics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013). Nevertheless, BLE scholars 
continue to assert the endowment effect as justification for a host of regulatory and 
legal preferences: 
 
The empirical support for endowment theory was never perfect.  In recent years, 
experimentalists have published data suggesting that the results of earlier labor-
atory experiments were not caused by loss aversion but by other factors.  By 
making a few changes to the experimental design – like better training subjects 
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unrealistic assumptions may suggest policies that can actually harm consumers 
in a real-world context – such as by exposing consumers to bait-and-switch 
tactics or heightened levels of confusion. 
B. The Evidence to the Contrary 
1. Actually, Discounting Seems to Be More Effective: The Dutch 
Study, Redux 
Although the evidence that BLE scholars actually cite in support of their 
argument is largely (if not completely) irrelevant to assessing whether sur-
charging or discounting is comparatively more effective at altering consumer 
behavior, there are some studies that suggest apposite results.  Indeed, one of 
them is the Dutch study discussed above.179  While BLE scholars do misuse 
the study’s misleading data regarding how consumers feel about surcharging 
versus discounting, they inexplicably fail to mention one of the study’s key 
findings: that both merchants and consumers in the study report that discount-
ing is more effective at changing consumer behavior than is surcharging.180 
The researchers in the Dutch study surveyed retailers and consumers re-
garding their personal experiences with surcharging and discounting.  The mer-
chants who used discounts reported that forty-three percent of those who were 
offered a cash discount refrained from paying with a payment card.181  At the 
same time, the merchants who surcharged estimated that twenty-seven percent 
of consumers who were informed about the surcharge refrained from using a 
 
in the auction mechanisms used in the experiments, changing the way subjects 
were given the items, and modifying the procedures for eliciting choices – to 
rule out alternative explanations, experimentalist were able to make “endow-
ment effects” that had been observed in the laboratory disappear.  Many other 
researchers have since replicated these results. . . . These results have led ex-
perimental economists and cognitive psychologists to develop alternatives to 
endowment theory. 
 
The legal literature has not kept up.  Legal scholars today still write as if . . 
. endowment theory were still one of the most robust results of behavioral eco-
nomics.  Having drawn heavily from experimental literature in the early 1990s, 
many legal scholars have not since returned to the source.  Thus while experi-
mentalists have called into question the thesis that the simple fact of ownership 
predictably changes people’s expressed preferences, legal scholars still write as 
if it does. 
 
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). 
 179. See VIS & TOTH, supra note 120, at 15–16. 
 180. See BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24. 
 181. See VIS & TOTH, supra note 120, at 9. 
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payment card.182  From the merchants’ perspective, it appears that cash dis-
counting was actually over fifty percent more effective at inducing consumers 
to use an alternative to payment cards – a result (if it is reliable) that is squarely 
at odds with BLE theories. 
From the perspective of consumers, the results were similar.  Twenty-
three percent of consumers claimed that they had been asked to pay a fee for 
using a payment card,183 and eight percent reported that they had been offered 
a cash discount.184  Consumers also reported that discounting, not surcharging, 
was more effective at altering their payment choice: Consumers claimed that 
they refrained from using a payment card in thirty-eight percent of the cases in 
which they were asked to pay a surcharge but refrained from using a payment 
card in fifty percent of the cases in which they were offered a cash discount.185  
Again, these results appear to contradict the BLE scholars’ assertion that sur-
charging is more effective than discounting at altering consumer behavior.186  
In actuality, although consumers may not be happy about it, they frequently 
pay surcharges nonetheless. 
Nor are the scholars alone in selectively citing to the Dutch study.  In their 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in the Expressions Hair 
Design case, the plaintiffs also cite to the study’s purported findings on con-
sumers’ subjective feelings about surcharging and discounting,187 yet make no 
 
 182. Id. at 8.  Some of the merchants in the survey simply impose the surcharge on 
the consumer without disclosing it.  Id. 
 183. Id. at 9. 
 184. Id. at 10. 
 185. Id. at 10, 15. 
 186. We hasten to add that one should also be cautious of drawing anything like a 
definitive conclusion from the study that discounting is more effective than surcharging 
at altering consumer behavior.  For example, it is not clear that the magnitudes of the 
surcharges and discounts were symmetrical, as the survey reports an “average” sur-
charge size for companies that only accept Visa cards of 3.4% and discounts ranging 
from one to ten percent, with no average discount size reported in the survey.  Id. at 6, 
9.  Moreover, the study itself is subject to clear limitations.  The sample size is small, 
and of the entire sample only about ten percent of merchants (thirty-two companies) 
ever used a surcharge, and only about nine percent offered discounts (twenty-eight 
companies).  Id. at 8.  Only five companies used both surcharges and discounts, and the 
composition of the type of business of the firms in each category is not the same (and 
we know little about their size).  Id.  Overall, in other words, the study may be compar-
ing apples and oranges.  On the other hand, both merchants and consumers consistently 
report that consumers were more responsive to discounts than surcharges, which pro-
vides some (small) degree of internal verification.  Id. at 8–10.  In general, then, the 
study’s findings should be treated with caution – but such cautions also apply to relying 
on the study to report (and interpret) the subjective feelings of consumers with respect 
to surcharging and discounting. 
 187. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Expressions Hair Design v. Schnei-
derman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (No. 15-1391).  At the merits stage of the case, this 
finding from the Vis & Toth study regarding consumers’ subjective feelings about sur-
charging and discounting was also cited by the BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 
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reference to the study’s primary results that consumers actually respond more 
effectively to discounts than to surcharges. 
2. Consumers Report That Discounts Matter More: The Phoenix 
Marketing Research Survey 
Further evidence (not offered or addressed by the state law opponents) 
regarding the relative effectiveness of surcharging versus discounting comes 
from Phoenix Marketing International, a payments industry consulting firm.  
For its 2014 Phoenix Consumer Payments Monitor report, the firm conducted 
an online survey of 4200 adult consumers about their experiences with sur-
charging and cash discounting.188 
Seventeen percent of the respondents in the survey reported shopping at 
a merchant that posted a notice that they would be charged an additional fee 
for using a credit card and twenty-two percent of consumers reported shopping 
at a merchant that offered a discount for using cash instead of a credit card.189  
Of those who were presented with a credit card surcharge, fifty-five percent 
reported that they used their credit card anyway, and forty-five percent used 
another payment method instead.190  But of those who were offered a cash dis-
count, only thirty percent still used their credit card and seventy percent 
switched to another payment mechanism (usually cash).191 
According to the results of this survey, therefore, cash discounting is al-
most twice as effective in persuading consumers to shift to an alternative pay-
ment method than is surcharging.  Again, this result is squarely at odds with 
BLE assertions about how consumers will supposedly behave when presented 
with surcharges and discounts. 
Finally, it is instructive to consider Target’s ongoing experience with dis-
counting for its REDcard, which provides indirect evidence to support the as-
sumption that consumers do respond to discounting between different payment 
devices, especially among otherwise close substitutes such as a Target credit 
card and a bank-issued credit card192 (both of which alleviate the need for con-
sumers to carry large amounts of cash in their wallets).  In 2010, Target first 
 
24, at 8, and Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Adam J. Levitin in Support of Petition-
ers, supra note 26, at 9, but neither brief discusses nor addresses the central findings of 
that study with respect to the relative efficacy of surcharging and discounting in chang-
ing consumer behavior. 
 188. 2014 PHX. CONSUMER PAYMENTS MONITOR, Credit Card Surcharges, Cash 
Discounts & Credit Card Minimums (Sept. 24, 2014) (unpublished data collection) (on 
file with authors).  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See infra notes 192–97. 
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introduced its five percent discount for shoppers using the Target REDcard.193  
In response, the penetration of the card grew from 5.9% of American consum-
ers in 2009 to 19.3% in 2013.194  Moreover, Target discovered that REDcard 
customers visit twice as often as other customers and spend about fifty percent 
more.195  By 2015, REDcard accounted for 22.3% of Target’s retail sales, a 
three-and-a-half-fold growth from the period prior to the cash-back deal.196  In-
dustry analysts attribute this entire growth to Target offering a five percent dis-
count on all purchases made using REDcard.197  As one industry analyst wrote, 
[A] key milestone for Target was the national launch of the 5% savings 
feature in the fall of 2010.  It was a bold decision and fundamentally 
changed the trajectory of REDcard penetration . . . . Aside from the 
Starbucks Card, there is probably no greater proof that U.S. consumers 
will adopt a different, largely unproven payment product if the incentive 
to do so is rich enough.198 
These empirical studies and real-world examples are squarely at odds 
with BLE claims that discounting is relatively ineffective at altering consumer 
behavior.  Coupled with the paucity and unreliability of the evidence purport-
edly supporting the BLE assertion, these examples significantly undermine the 
BLE claims. 
V. A DIFFERENT STORY – IN WHICH THE MERCHANTS ARE 
LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES, NOT CONSUMERS 
The available evidence uniformly contradicts the theoretical claims of 
BLE and thus the contention that merchants seek the ability to surcharge be-
cause it is more effective at redirecting consumers to use alternative payment 
devices than is cash discounting.  Although none of the evidence is without 
defects, and although there is relatively little of it, the evidence that exists in-
dicates that surcharging is less effective than cash discounting at inducing con-
sumers to switch to other payment devices. 
 
 193. Press Release, Target, Target Cardholders Receive 5% Off Beginning This 
Weekend (Oct. 14, 2010), https://corporate.target.com/press/releases/2010/10/target-
cardholders-receive-5-off. 
 194. See Trefis Team, Growing REDcard Penetration, Improving Online Sales and 
Smaller Stores Likely to Drive Target’s Revenue Per Square Feet, NASDAQ (Apr. 1, 
2014, 1:51 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/growing-redcard-penetration-improv-
ing-online-sales-and-smaller-stores-likely-to-drive-targets-revenue-per-square-feet-
cm340660. 
 195. Id. 
 196. John Grund & Jeff Kalski, A Look at the Evolution of Target’s REDcard Prod-
uct Suite, FIRST ANNAPOLIS (May 2016), http://www.firstannapolis.com/articles/a-
look-at-the-evolution-of-targets-redcard-product-suite?status=success. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
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So why, then, do merchants insist so adamantly – bringing case after case 
all the way to the Supreme Court – on having the ability to surcharge?  Regard-
less of its complete lack of evidentiary support, the BLE argument does have a 
seemingly coherent story behind it, which jibes with conventional wisdom.  If, 
as the evidence suggests, the BLE theory is wrong, what explains the unequiv-
ocal, observed behavior of the merchants who have spent millions of dollars 
fighting for the ability to surcharge? 
Experience in countries where surcharging has been permitted for some 
time suggests a possible answer: Merchants value the ability to surcharge be-
cause it enables them to engage in strategic behavior without bearing the full 
cost of doing so – exactly the sort of opportunistic conduct against consumers 
that led networks to include no-surcharge provisions in their network contracts 
to begin with and that later led lawmakers to enact legislation that prohibits 
surcharging by merchants.  Surcharging enables merchants to opportunistically 
advertise one price on the shelf and later ambush the consumer with a higher 
price at the check-out (especially where the consumer is not a repeat customer).  
It also allows merchants to opportunistically impose costs on consumers in sit-
uations where consumers are constrained in their ability to use any payment 
device other than a card (as when purchasing airline tickets or hotel rooms). 
And experience in these countries where regulators have forced card net-
works to allow merchant surcharging reveals that, when given the opportunity, 
merchants frequently surcharge well above any reasonable estimate of their 
cost of accepting payment cards.199  This is because they surcharge based on 
their ability to price discriminate among consumers, impose surcharges in 
those industries where consumers have limited alternatives to paying with a 
payment card, and routinely fail to disclose surcharging practices or fees in a 
timely and adequate manner. 
A. The Economics of Surcharging by Merchants 
The merchants in Expressions Hair Design contend that “because sur-
charges and discounts are ‘equal in every way except [their] label,’ only the 
labels can explain why a State would want to bar one but not the other.”200  
Several of their amici make similar claims.201 
 
 199. See FRONTIER ECON., TAKEN FOR A RIDE? REVIEWING THE RESERVE BANK’S 
SURCHARGING REFORMS 1 (2013), http://www.frontier-economics.com.au/docu-
ments/2013/03/taken-ride.pdf. 
 200. Brief of Amici Curiae International Center for Law & Economics and Scholars 
of Law and Economics in Support of Respondents at 6, Expressions Hair Design v. 
Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (No. 15-1391) [hereinafter ICLE Amicus] (al-
teration in original) (quoting Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6). 
 201. See, e.g., BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 1–3; Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Professor Adam J. Levitin in Support of Petitioners, supra note 26, at 2–3, 9; 
Brief of Amici Curiae Retail Litigation Center, Retail Council of New York State, Flor-
ida Retail Federation, and Food Marketing Institute in Support of Petitioners at 13, 19, 
Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391); Brief for Amici Curiae Ahold 
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But, as a functional and economic matter, surcharges and discounts are, 
in fact, different.  In the first, and simplest, place, surcharges increase the final 
price above a benchmark, “reference” price, while discounts decrease it.  But 
even this fails to capture the extent of the real, and not merely rhetorical, dif-
ferences between them.  Consider the full quotation from Cass Sunstein, refer-
enced above and only partially quoted in the merchants’ brief: 
The status quo is usually the reference point, so that losses are so de-
fined when people are asked, or forced, to relinquish what they now 
have.  But simply through inventive terminology, it is possible to ma-
nipulate the frame so as to make a change appear to be a loss rather than 
a gain, or vice versa. These manipulations occur socially – through the 
acts and deeds of other people and institutions.  Consider a company 
that says “cash discount” rather than “credit card surcharge.”  Or con-
sider a parent who says that for behavior X, rather than behavior Y, a 
child will be rewarded, as opposed to saying that for behavior Y, rather 
than behavior X, a child will be punished.202 
Important to note is that the “reference point” in Sunstein’s examples is 
the same point.  The child’s room is either clean or not clean, regardless of the 
way the parent frames the consequence; the frame itself does not alter the status 
quo.  And, although not descriptively accurate, it is clear that the price from 
which either a discount or a surcharge is applied in his hypothetical is also the 
same: it is the status quo – the reference point. 
But, in actuality, the reference point does change when merchants choose 
to discount or surcharge: The asserted “mathematical equivalence” is the hy-
pothetical amount of the difference between two prices and does not take into 
account the starting price from which “price plus surcharge” and “price minus 
discount” diverge.  That is, a merchant must set a different base price for dis-
counting and surcharging if she is going to maintain their mathematical equiv-
alence – and this difference matters. 
First, it is worth noting that a price itself is not speech.203  The merchant’s 
decision to pick a particular reference price from which the merchant may then 
impose a surcharge is conduct, not speech.  Whether economically advisable 
or not, governments frequently regulate prices and do so without violating the 
First Amendment.204 
 
U.S.A., Inc., Albertsons LLC, H.E. Butt Grocery Co., Hy-Vee, Inc., The Kroger Co., 
Safeway Inc., Spirit Airlines, Inc., and Walgreen Co. in Support of Petitioners at 19, 
Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391); Brief for Alan S. Frankel as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, 11, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 
1144 (No. 15-1391). 
 202. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1312 (emphasis added). 
 203. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1150–51. 
 204. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that “[p]ricing is a routine subject of economic regulation”), 
vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
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Second, retailers are not free to choose any reference price.  Because a 
merchant’s ability to choose a posted price is affected by market competition, 
it may not be equally feasible for a merchant to set the posted “reference” price 
at both amounts necessary to maintain the mathematical equivalence asserted 
by stylized examples.  As a result, surcharging and discounting entail different 
calculations in order to devise the specific pricing scheme suitable for each 
mechanism. 
Third, the amount of the difference may not actually be equivalent.  In 
fact, the evidence suggests that surcharge amounts tend to deviate more from 
the base price than do discount amounts.205  Surely this alone could account for 
any evidence (if it existed) that surcharges were “more effective” than dis-
counts at changing consumers’ behavior. 
And fourth, as noted above, a surcharge is manifestly not the same as a 
discount from the consumer’s perspective.  When a consumer is met at the reg-
ister with a higher price than that posted when she selected the store or chose 
her items (all of a sudden $100 becomes $103) the information conveyed by 
the posted price becomes inaccurate.  While, obviously, a lower price at the 
register because of a discount would also represent a deviation from the posted 
price, for equally obvious reasons there is no harm associated with such a de-
viation.  For the consumer, the difference between the two is not merely rhe-
torical. 
As the Behavioral Economics Scholars’ brief in Expressions Hair Design 
argues, discounting and surcharging could have different effects on consumer 
behavior.206  BLE scholars assert that this difference means that labels, and 
labels only, matter.  But it is far more straightforward to see that a discount is 
inherently and meaningfully different than a surcharge, whatever their nominal 
mathematical equivalence, and that the difference is not simply a function of 
how they are labeled but rather how they are devised, implemented, and dis-
closed by merchants, and how they are understood by consumers. 
As a result of these differences, surcharges enable (and arise from) a par-
ticular set of sales and pricing practices not available with discounting.  Pri-
marily, surcharges enable merchants to price discriminate when customers are 
unable to provide an alternative form of payment or are unaware of the mer-
chants’ pricing practices because they are not repeat shoppers.  Having invested 
time in the shopping process, decided to purchase her items, and waited to 
check out, the customer’s marginal cost of duplicating this effort in order to 
avoid a higher, final price at the register may induce her to accept the higher 
price-plus-surcharge, even though she would not have done so earlier. 
 
 205. See infra The Ability to Charge Supra-compensatory Prices. 
 206. BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 11–12.  Although, as we discuss 
supra at The Evidence “Supporting” BLE Claims, all available evidence suggests they 
are wrong about the direction of the likely relative effects. 
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1. The Ability to Price Discriminate 
Standard economics thus provides a better explanation as to why mer-
chants seek to surcharge consumer payment card usage instead of providing 
cash discounts: The ability to surcharge enables merchants to extract economic 
rents from consumers (and ultimately other network participants) by facilitat-
ing more effective price discrimination among consumers based on their rela-
tive availability to switch away from payment cards. 
Although discounts and surcharges can be mathematically identical, they 
are not practically identical from the perspective of either merchants or con-
sumers.  For merchants, the ability to impose a card surcharge empowers them 
to “hold up the consumer, who has made the specific investment to come to the 
store and inspect wares.”207  By contrast, a cash discount is seen by merchants 
as “a giveaway to consumers who already are in the shop and have cash.”208  
As we have written previously: “The willingness of a merchant to surcharge, 
therefore, appears to be only coincidentally related to whether a particular pay-
ment system actually costs more than alternatives.  Instead, it is more likely 
related to consumers’ price sensitivity for particular payment systems, rather 
than costs.”209  To the extent that surcharging allows merchants to engage in a 
bait-and-switch at the register after consumers have shopped and selected prod-
ucts (especially in large retail stores) based on posted prices, a surcharge pre-
sents a kind of trap, imposing the threat of higher prices at a moment when 
consumers’ price sensitivity is reduced.210  For consumers who are unwilling 
or unable to forego some of their intended purchases, or unwilling or unable to 
spend the time to select a new basket of goods at lower cost to match available 
cash, the willingness to pay a surcharge may increase.  In effect, the surcharge 
at the register permits merchants to artificially construct a situation for unsus-
pecting shoppers in which the switch to an alternative payment (or other form 
of self-help) is made more difficult. 
In this sense, a surcharge permits merchants to engage in price discrimi-
nation by imposing higher costs on first-time or one-time shoppers (e.g., trav-
elers) and those with other constraints that decrease their sensitivity to price 
increases and transfer the benefits of those price increases to other shoppers 
and the merchants themselves. 
The recognition that surcharging behavior by merchants is driven primar-
ily by merchant price discrimination rather than consumer welfare has been 
further developed by Jean Tirole, the 2014 winner of the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics, in a recent article co-authored with Helene Bourguignon and Renato 
Gomes.211  Bourguignon, Gomes, and Tirole develop a model of “payment-
method-based price discrimination” that turns on the ability of merchants to 
 
 207. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 20. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See LEE, MANNE, MORRIS & ZYWICKI, supra note 79, at 21. 
 210. See supra notes 37–40. 
 211. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38. 
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extract rents from consumers based on the relative ease with which consumers 
can avoid a surcharge on the use of a particular payment mechanism.212 
In particular, Bourguignon, Gomes, and Tirole predict that surcharging 
will be most common in industries where consumers have less information 
about a merchant’s surcharging policy; in particular industries, such as travel, 
where consumers engage in infrequent or one-time shopping; or in situations 
in which consumers have little practical alternative but to use a payment card, 
such as when buying airline tickets, hotels, and when online shopping.213  As 
they argue, “the assumption of imperfect information [by consumers] is the key 
to understanding why consumers and merchants do not view cash discounts 
and card surcharges as equivalent.”214 
The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) made a similar 
observation in its Payment Surcharges Study, offered in response to a com-
plaint accusing the British travel industry of abusive surcharging: 
The OFT considers that actual market power is not the primary driver 
of whether surcharging is introduced or persists within a market.  In-
stead surcharging is more likely to persist where products or services 
have the following characteristics: 
 consumers make infrequent purchases 
 consumers incur search costs to discover the surcharge 
 the product and/or transaction processes are complex, tailored or 
not standardised between retailers, and/or 
 the product is time limited or quantity limited.215 
As with the example of the shopper surprised at the register above, under the 
OFT’s model of expected surcharging, the primary focus is on the knowledge 
of consumers and their reasonable opportunities to anticipate the surcharge 
ahead of time, as well as their relative abilities to avoid surcharges.  According 
to the OFT, this is especially problematic in light of the standard practice of 
merchants to reveal the size of a surcharge only late in the purchasing pro-
cess.216 
Where merchants offer services to tourists or consumers who shop at the 
store infrequently, for example, merchants have little incentive to provide – 
and incur the cost of – the desirable amenity of accepting payment cards.  In-
stead, some merchants in these industries may have an incentive to “hold up” 
consumers by charging them for using a payment card.  This threat of holdup  
 212. Id. at 14. 
 213. Id. at 19. 
 214. Id. 
 215. OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 30. 
 216. Id. at 6. 
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is especially significant when the surcharge is disclosed only at the point of 
sale,217 after the consumer has invested (sometimes considerable) time, and 
which would require the consumer to incur additional costs in order to adjust 
her purchases or travel to another store and start the process over again of 
searching for and collecting her desired purchases in order to avoid the price 
increase.  Similarly, with respect to online shopping – where the surcharge is 
often disclosed only at the final screen of the checkout process – consumers 
may be reluctant to expend additional time and effort locating and re-selecting 
purchases from another merchant’s site.218   
2. The Ability to Charge Supra-compensatory Prices 
Merchants are also not indifferent between surcharges and discounts for 
another, related reason: The willingness of a merchant to offer a cash discount 
(in a relatively competitive market) is inherently self-limiting and will be 
capped by the actual cost difference between two payment devices.  As long 
as prices are set in relatively competitive markets, the merchant will maximize 
revenue at the competitive price (somewhere close to cost for most retail 
goods) and rarely discount for cash at a rate greater than the actual cost differ-
ence between cash and credit.219 
Surcharges, by contrast, contain no inherent self-limiting cap.  Instead, a 
merchant will surcharge at whatever rate will maximize her profits, which will 
often be a rate that exceeds any reasonable estimate of the cost difference be-
tween the two products.  In the surcharge case, the amount of the surcharge is 
a function not of cost but of the consumer’s price elasticity – her sensitivity to 
price changes, in other words – at the time of the surcharge.  Merchants will 
seek to surcharge at the rate that enables them to maximize the rents that they 
extract from consumers, regardless of the underlying costs.  In fact, if permit-
ted, merchants will even surcharge transactions for which payment cards are 
less expensive than cash if the merchant can get away with it.220  Indeed, Bour-
guignon, Gomes, and Tirole observe that the merchant will always tend to 
“overshoot” the surcharge relative to the economically efficient surcharge level 
 
 217. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 19–20. 
 218. For example, according to the OFT, consumers in the passenger transport mar-
kets (airlines, ferries, and rail) had to go through four to six web pages before learning 
that a payment surcharge would be added to the total price.  See Credit Card Charges: 
The Facts, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 23, 2011, 2:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fi-
nance/personalfinance/borrowing/creditcards/8974853/Credit-card-charges-the-
facts.html. 
 219. See generally Marc Rysman & Julian Wright, The Economics of Payment 
Cards, 13 REV. NETWORK ECON. 303 (2014) (providing a literature review of inter-
change fees and contrasting interchange fees set in monopoly and competitive markets 
with socially optimal interchange fees). 
 220. See Bolt, Jonker & van Renselaar, supra note 153, at 1740 (noting that Dutch 
merchants impose surcharges on card transactions even for transactions where cards 
are less costly to the merchant than cash). 
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“in order to extract more rents from consumers” and will always tend to “un-
dershoot” the size of a cash discount because it essentially amounts to a “gift” 
to consumers who were already planning to make a purchase and then are pre-
sented with a lower effective price at checkout.221 
As a result, surcharges create opportunities for merchants to charge supra-
compensatory prices by increasing surcharge rates beyond their costs of ac-
cepting credit cards.  Many customers will simply pay the additional amount 
because they have no viable alternative to paying with a credit card by the time 
they learn of the surcharge.  And the customer will often incorrectly believe 
that the additional fees are the fault of the credit-card company and not the 
merchant – i.e., that the merchant is just “passing it on.” 
To return to the mattress-store example,222 the consumer will decide to 
shop at Store A because its advertised price ($1000) is lower than Store B’s 
($1030), and the consumer does not have information about either store’s sur-
charging practices.  Once there, the consumer (carrying far less than $1000 in 
cash) often minimizes her own costs by simply paying the surcharge, rather 
than terminating the transaction and beginning anew at another mattress store.  
Knowing this, the store can maximize its profits by setting the surcharge rate 
just below the consumer’s threshold for continuing with the transaction.  That 
rate may be far in excess of the store’s cost of accepting credit cards, and, in 
any event, will bear no necessary relationship to that cost – the recovery of 
which is ostensibly the reason for imposing the surcharge. 
Cash discounting, by contrast, does not facilitate such pricing prac-
tices because market competition operates more effectively to ensure 
that cash discount rates reflect a merchant’s actual costs of card ac-
ceptance. Consequently, a merchant generally will not be able to use 
cash discounts to extract above-cost profits because doing so would re-
quire the merchant to advertise the supracompensatory price.  And in a 
competitive market, advertising a higher price will disadvantage the 
merchant, as competitors with similar marginal costs can advertise 
lower prices.  Further, a merchant has no economic incentive to offer a 
cash discount that exceeds the amount of its cost of accepting credit 
cards.  To do so would generally erode the merchant’s profit margin.  
Thus, while cash discounts will, as a practical matter, rarely exceed the 
actual cost difference between two payment devices, surcharges lack 
this inherent limitation. 223 
Here again, the real-world experience in other countries confirms that sur-
charges facilitate above-cost pricing.  As noted above, researchers have found 
that Dutch merchants routinely surcharged at rates that substantially exceeded 
 
 221. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 21–22. 
 222. See discussion at supra notes 41–42. 
 223. ICLE Amicus, supra note 200, at 23 (citation omitted). 
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the actual cost differential between cash and credit payments.224  Another in-
vestigation in 2016 found that many British merchants imposed surcharges be-
tween one and three percent, even though the marginal cost to British mer-
chants of credit card transactions was between 0.3 and 0.6%.225 
Australia has had the same experience, and one study – the Choice Report 
– found that Australian businesses “embraced surcharges as a new revenue 
stream.”226  The central bank’s own analysis also found that “surcharge levels 
on some transactions appear to be well in excess of merchants’ likely ac-
ceptance costs.”227  As a result, the central bank and the Australian government 
have adopted further reforms in an attempt to regulate what it deems “excessive 
surcharging.”228 
B. What Economics Predicts: BLE Theory May Align with Prac-
tice in the Abstract, But Not in the Particulars 
Thus, it is not surprising that when merchants are given the choice be-
tween offering discounts or surcharges they will tend to impose surcharges. 
This disparity is striking in light of the fact that, as discussed above, other stud-
ies of Dutch merchants and consumers suggest that discounting may be more 
effective at persuading consumers to switch to cash or other payment de-
vices.229  Indeed, it seems more accurate to conclude that merchants prefer sur-
charges to discounts precisely because consumers who are surcharged are less 
likely to switch to alternative payment devices (such as cash), thereby enabling 
merchants with a greater opportunity to extract rents from consumers.  Dis-
counts, by contrast, offer merchants no similar strategic options. 
If this view of surcharging is correct, the level and distribution of sur-
charging practices by merchants should be only coincidentally related to the 
actual cost difference between cash and cards in various industries.  Surcharg-
ing should be most common in industries where the potential for opportunism 
is greatest, such as those industries where consumers make infrequent pur-
chases (such as restaurants and tourism) or those industries where consumers 
 
 224. See Bolt, Jonker & van Renselaar, supra note 153, at 1740. 
 225. See James Daley, Why Are We Still Being Charged for Paying by Credit 
Card?, FAIRER FIN. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.fairerfinance.com/busi-
ness/blog/why-are-we-still-being-charged-for-paying-by-credit-card; see also OFT 
PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 48. 
 226.  See CHOICE, CREDIT CARD SURCHARGING IN AUSTRALIA 8 (2014), 
http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/biz_res/ftweb/pdfs/About_us/Credit_card_sur-
charges_part1.pdf. 
 227. RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., REVIEW OF CARD PAYMENTS REGULATION: 
CONCLUSIONS PAPER 30 (2016), http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-and-infrastruc-
ture/review-of-card-payments-regulation/pdf/review-of-card-payments-regulation-
conclusions-paper-2016-05.pdf. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See supra Actually, Discounting Seems to Be More Effective: The Dutch 
Study, Redux.  
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have few alternatives to cards for making purchases (such as for airline tickets 
or rental cars).230  And, further, we should expect merchants to hide surcharges 
(but not discounts) and reveal them only when doing so would necessitate the 
consumer incurring additional costs sufficient to induce them to absorb the sur-
charge. 
By contrast, if the BLE hypothesis is correct, surcharging should be more 
or less randomly distributed among industries.  It should be closely related to 
the actual cost difference between various payment devices.  And it should be 
posted up-front, exactly as a cash discount would be – precisely because the 
BLE theory is one that turns on disclosure per se, not the timing of disclosure 
or other conduct with which it might be associated. 
1. The Evidence Points Toward the Economic Story, Not the BLE 
One 
Although there appear to be no comprehensive studies of surcharging be-
havior across industries, available evidence shows that both surcharging and 
abusive surcharging (above-cost) behavior appears to be most common in in-
dustries where the opportunity for price-discrimination-based surcharging is 
greatest, such as “air travel, holiday travel, restaurants, taxis, and gas sta-
tions.”231 
A 2012 European Commission analysis of practices in the European Un-
ion found that Ireland had the highest rate of surcharging by merchants gener-
ally, with fifteen percent of merchants imposing surcharges.232  Throughout the 
European Union, only three countries reported a share of merchants that im-
posed surcharges at or above ten percent (Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands).233  On the other hand, “[t]he travel/hotel sector was notably 
prone to surcharging.”234  The average proportion of surcharging merchants 
added up to 26.9% in the United Kingdom and 34.8% in Ireland.235  Finally, 
“[a]irlines, especially low-cost ones, are also particularly adept at ‘surprising’ 
their customers with card surcharges at the point of sale.”236 
The United Kingdom’s OFT has done extensive research on the practice 
of merchant surcharging and has found widespread above-cost and poorly dis-
closed surcharging practices in the country’s passenger travel industries, where 
 
 230. See LEE, MANNE, MORRIS & ZYWICKI, supra note 79, at 35. 
 231. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 22. 
 232. Id. at 16 (reporting findings of European Commission). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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there are few alternatives to card payments for purchasing tickets.237  Accord-
ing to OFT, consumers spent about £300 million in card surcharges in 2010 in 
the airline sector alone.238 
In fact, some United Kingdom airlines and train lines impose costs for 
using credit cards as high as seven percent (for Jet2) or 4.5% (for Rail Easy).239  
An investigation by the British consumer group Fairer Finance in 2016 found 
that even though the cost to British merchants of credit card transactions was 
no higher than 0.6% and in most instances no higher than 0.3% (the maximum 
interchange fee allowed under a new European Union regulation), at that time 
many merchants were still imposing surcharges of one percent, two percent, or 
even three percent.240  As expected, airline companies were overrepresented on 
the list of companies that charged the highest surcharges.241  Many entities have 
imposed surcharges of two percent or more for paying with a card – and this 
practice persisted despite a 2012 regulation that limited permissible surcharg-
ing fees to the actual cost incurred by the merchant.242 
Needless to say, none of these rates bear the slightest resemblance to any 
cost differential between credit cards and alternative payment devices. 
OFT also found that abusive surcharging was more prevalent in online 
shopping243 – again a market where it is difficult for consumers to purchase 
goods without using a payment card and where merchants can delay the timing 
of surcharge disclosures until late in the shopping process.  Thus, as OFT ob-
serves, 
Surcharging is also more prevalent online than offline . . . .   
. . . [O]nline retailers may be more likely to surcharge simply be-
cause consumers do not have the option to pay with cash.  If in-store 
retailers attempt to surcharge, consumers are often able to switch to 
paying with cash.  Online, the lack of choice (without incurring the time 
or financial costs of applying for niche payment mechanisms) means 
consumers often have no choice but to pay the surcharge particularly if 
they consider all online retailers have similar practices and/or if they 
 
 237. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 56. 
 238. Id. at 4 
 239. Id. at 38 tbl.6.2. 
 240. See Daley, supra note 225.  Fairer Finance was co-founded by James Daley, 
the previous director of the campaign at Which? that petitioned the United Kingdom’s 
Office of Fair Trading to investigate excessive surcharging fees.  See Our People, 
FAIRER FIN., https://www.fairerfinance.com/about-us/our-people (last visited Sept. 3, 
2017). 
 241. See Red Card for Card Charges, FAIRER FIN., http://www.fair-
erfinance.com/campaigns/red-card-for-card-charges (last visited Sept. 3, 2017). 
 242. See id.  This leaves aside the fact that as Bourguignon, Gomes, and Tirole 
demonstrate, surcharging should not be permitted when interchange fees are capped by 
regulation.  See Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 25. 
 243. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 25. 
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have to invest significant time tailoring products on a number of web-
sites in order to discover the surcharges.244 
This pattern of surcharging is not unique to the European Union or United 
Kingdom.  In Australia, a comprehensive regulatory package devised by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia in 2003 imposed new price controls on credit card 
interchange fees but also permitted merchants to impose surcharges on credit 
card use.245  The reaction of merchants was swift and predictable.  Qantas Air-
lines, for example, imposed a whopping surcharge of 5.6% of the cost of a 
transaction, a fee that far exceeds any estimate of the actual cost of accepting 
card payments.246  This cost disparity is especially striking in light of the fact 
that the underlying interchange fee had been slashed as a result of the same 
regulation.247  More generally, every airline in Australia imposed a surcharge, 
and the size of the surcharges varied substantially – and none bore any rela-
tionship to relative costs.248 
A consumer survey conducted by Choice, a prominent consumer rights 
organization in Australia, found that, by far, the most common industry in 
which consumers report having seen surcharges was airlines (63.8% reporting 
seeing surcharges), followed in order by telephone/mobiles/Internet, holiday 
travel, restaurants/formal dining, taxis, and petrol – all industries for which at 
least twenty percent of consumers witnessed surcharging.249  Other industries 
such as groceries, appliances, insurance, clothing/footwear, fast food, and oth-
ers all surcharged much less frequently.250 
As should be readily apparent from this list, a pattern emerges where in-
dustries that surcharge are those – such as airline tickets, hotels, and formal 
dining restaurants – where consumers often find it difficult or virtually impos-
sible to avoid paying with a payment card, or where they are unlikely to be 
repeat customers.  These are exactly the conditions under which merchants 
have ample opportunity to hold up consumers with surcharges.  In addition, the 
Choice survey found that close to half of Australians who reported paying a 
credit card surcharge claimed that they were not offered or made aware of an 
 
 244. Id. at 27–28. 
 245. See Keith Bradsher, U.S. Looks to Australia on Credit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/your-money/credit-and-debit-
cards/25card.html?__r=1. 
 246. See id. 
 247. As Bourguignon, Gomes, and Tirole observe, where interchange fees are 
capped by regulation, such as debit cards in the United States after the passage of the 
Durbin Amendment, surcharging is almost economically unjustified as the interchange 
fee cap eliminates any relevant price difference for which surcharging might otherwise 
be arguably justified.  Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 23–24. 
 248. See CHOICE, supra note 226, at 17–18. 
 249. Id. at 11. 
 250. See id. 
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alternative, surcharge-free, payment method.251  In many instances where sur-
charge-free methods are made available, they are often so cumbersome or im-
practicable as to be unrealistic – such as buying a ticket and paying in cash at 
the airline’s airport ticketing counter.252  Similarly, a stay of even a few nights 
in a hotel can result in charges of several hundred dollars, a bill that is difficult 
to imagine paying in cash, especially given that the consumer is typically away 
from home. 
In these circumstances there are few alternatives to using payment cards, 
a reality that merchants can and do exploit by imposing surcharges on custom-
ers.253  Business travelers may also be more willing to pay surcharges for items 
such as airline tickets, hotels, and car rentals, as those costs would typically be 
reimbursed by their employer.254  Similarly, abusive, above-cost surcharging 
appears to be more prevalent in online shopping, where consumers again have 
little alternative but to use a credit or debit card.255 
2. A Further Note on Patterns of Abusive Surcharging 
Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar found a similar dynamic of above-cost 
surcharging in the Netherlands.  On average, Dutch merchants imposed a sur-
charge of about 2.3% on all card transactions, both debit and credit combined 
– a rate that was higher than most credit card interchange fees, much less debit 
card fees, in Holland.256  Moreover, they also found that while some merchants 
surcharge all card transactions and some do not surcharge at all, many mer-
chants that surcharge do so on those transactions that fall below a certain level 
– EUR 10 on average.257 
That many merchants continued to surcharge on transactions below the 
EUR 10 “threshold amount” identified by Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar sug-
gests that many merchants were surcharging transactions for which card pay-
ments were actually less expensive on average than cash.  The authors report 
that the EUR 10 threshold was set many years ago and was based on the idea 
that, from the merchant’s perspective, there is a break-even point for the rela-
tive cost efficiency of cash versus card payments.258  Whether it is efficient to 
use cash or a card depends on a variety of factors including: the prevailing 
wage rate in an economy (cash handling and transportation is highly labor- 
 251. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 18 (describing CHOICE find-
ings). 
 252. CHOICE, supra note 226, at 18–19. 
 253. Id. at 14. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., A VARIATION TO THE SURCHARGING 
STANDARDS: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 8 (2011), https://www.rba.gov.au/publica-
tions/consultations/201112-variation-surcharging-standards/pdf/201112-variation-sur-
charging-standards.pdf. 
 256. See Bolt, Jonker & van Renselaar, supra note 153, at 1740. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 1739. 
55
Zywicki et al.: Behavioral Economics Goes to Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
824 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
intensive and thus cash payments are relatively more expensive where wage 
rates are higher), the speed, cost, and reliability of a country’s telecommunica-
tions technology (card payments are relatively less expensive when telecom-
munications are inexpensive and fast), and the crime rate (more crime raises 
the costs of acquiring, using, and handling cash), among other things.259  The 
merchants’ decision to set the threshold at EUR 10 reflects a several-years-old, 
complex estimate of the break-even point (at that time) between the cost of 
cash and cards. 
Yet as Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar note, this break-even point has 
changed dramatically over time as the cost of card payments has declined.  
Whereas the prior break-even point might have reasonably been estimated at 
EUR 10, the average break-even point is lower than that today.260  Neverthe-
less, many merchants still surcharged on any transaction under EUR 10 – sug-
gesting that they are surcharging on transactions where payment cards are ac-
tually less expensive than cash.  The authors note further that this may under-
estimate the full harm to consumers from opportunistic surcharging: In order 
to avoid paying the surcharge some consumers might instead purchase addi-
tional items to bring their purchase amount above the minimum threshold, an 
alternative way for merchants to extract consumer surplus (notably, at the ex-
pense of other merchants, of course).261 
As a result of this strong tendency for merchants to impose excessive sur-
charging fees, within a few years regulatory agencies in these countries (as well 
as in the European Union) were forced to revisit those industries with still fur-
ther complicated interventions designed to restrain excessive surcharging be-
havior.262 
C. The Effects on Regulation 
The phenomenon of above-cost surcharging is not only common, but it is 
also virtually universal where surcharging is permitted.263  But it bears repeat-
ing that the practical consequences of discounting and surcharging are not iden-
tical for consumers and merchants.  And they are not identical for regulators 
either.  As noted, permitting cash discounting is inherently self-limiting in that 
the merchant will never discount at a rate that is larger than the estimated cost 
difference between different payment devices.  Permitting surcharging, by con-
trast, further requires maintenance of a regulatory apparatus and enforcement 
regime to police above-cost surcharging.  It also requires a mechanism for es-
tablishing the cost differentials between different payment devices in order to 
 
 259. See Zywicki, supra note 73, at 16–22. 
 260. See Bolt, Jonker & van Renselaar, supra note 153, at 1739. 
 261. See id. at 1739–40. 
 262. See infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra What Economics Predicts: BLE Theory May Align with Practice in 
the Abstract, But Not in the Particulars. 
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restrict the merchants’ inevitable efforts to unfairly extract rents from consum-
ers. 
This distinction suggests why policymakers and enforcement officials 
might legitimately prefer rules that permit cash discounting but prohibit credit 
card surcharging.  In fact, virtually every country that has permitted surcharg-
ing has later had to revisit the issue to establish new rules to address the ubiq-
uitous problem of above-cost surcharging, including Australia264 and the 
United Kingdom.265  As the Reserve Bank of Australia observed when it 
opened consideration of new regulations to restrict abusive surcharging prac-
tices, “In recent years . . . some surcharging practices that potentially distort 
price signals – such as surcharging in excess of card acceptance costs – have 
become more widespread . . . .”266 
In particular, as noted above, in certain industries Australian consumers 
have increasingly been harmed by surcharges on card payments that far exceed 
any reasonable cost recoupment.267  In some instances Australian merchants 
imposed surcharges that exceeded their actual cost by as much as 2,670 per-
cent.268  We are unaware of consumer complaints in any country because of 
merchants discounting cash payments by 2670% more than the cost differential 
between cash and cards. 
Experience in other countries suggests, therefore, that surcharging will 
not be uniform across all merchants in the economy, but rather that some mer-
chants, in some industries, will have a greater ability to extract consumer rents 
through surcharging than others.  This in turn suggests that merchants that can 
more effectively surcharge consumers will have a new revenue stream open to 
them as compared to merchants in industries that cannot surcharge. 
For example, if online merchants can impose surcharges more easily than 
brick-and-mortar merchants, then online merchants can lower posted prices 
and capture higher volumes, requiring competing merchants who charge a sin-
gle price, or who only discount for cash, to meet the online merchant’s prices 
– but not make up for lost revenue with surcharges.  And while it might seem 
that, whether intentionally or not, this effect would also benefit cash customers 
who otherwise subsidize payment card customers, in reality the supposed 
 
 264. See RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., supra note 227, at 30. 
 265. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 48. 
 266. RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., A VARIATION TO THE SURCHARGING STANDARDS: 
FINAL REFORMS AND REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT 1 (2012), 
https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-and-infrastructure/cards/201206-var-surcharging-
stnds-fin-ref-ris/pdf/201206-var-surcharging-stnds-fin-ref-ris.pdf. 
 267. See CHOICE, supra note 226, at 18. 
 268. See Andy Kollmorgen, Are You Being Charged to Charge?, CHOICE (Oct. 10, 
2014), https://www.choice.com.au/money/credit-cards-and-loans/credit-cards/arti-
cles/excessive-credit-card-surcharging-update.  In May 2013, for example, Choice con-
firmed that Australian airlines were imposing surcharges ranging from 4.2 percent to 
17 percent on airline tickets bought using a credit card, which made the total merchant 
service fee markups between 339 percent and 2312 percent.  Id.  Choice also reported 
that Cabcharge, a taxi service, imposed a surcharge of 11 percent for using a card.  Id. 
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cross-subsidy from cash to credit customers already is not as large as com-
monly believed.269  In addition, while higher-income households may be more 
likely to have credit cards, they may also be more likely to have ready access 
to greater amounts of liquid cash, enabling them to avoid surcharges more eas-
ily for more-expensive products.270 
But more important, to the extent that enabling some merchants to differ-
entially extract rents from consumers ends up making payment cards less at-
tractive overall, the end result will be to reduce the value generated by the en-
tire credit card network to consumers, merchants, issuers, and society alike (as 
there are social costs to widespread use of cash, such as increased tax evasion 
and crime facilitation).271  For merchants, however, the effect will be uneven: 
Those that can recoup through surcharging will gain the full benefit of the sur-
charge but will impose the costs on all merchants, bearing only a small fraction 
of the costs themselves. 
If surcharging is applied primarily to extract rents from consumers who 
have little alternative but to pay with a card rather than to recoup costs,272 then 
while this might create some downward pressure on interchange fees (as some 
lower courts have claimed) there is no reason to believe that much, if any, of 
the revenue generated from surcharging will be refunded to consumers.  Nor is 
there any reason to believe that much of the savings provided to merchants 
from lower interchange fees or greater use of cash is passed on to consumers, 
either.273  Thus, if merchants are permitted to surcharge credit card payments, 
consumers could end up paying more to use their cards while receiving little or 
no offsetting benefit in the form of lower retail prices.  More specifically, the 
increase in credit card charges could be larger than any offsetting price reduc-
tion at the register – and this effect could extend to other merchants, affecting 
consumers everywhere (and not just at those stores that adopted surcharging).  
Instead, merchants that are better able to opportunistically target groups of con-
sumers for price discrimination will profit at the expense of those merchants 
that are less able to do so, as well as at the expense of consumers generally. 
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VI. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND 
DISCLOSURE REGULATION 
A. Private Incentives to Convey Accurate Information 
In a related fashion, the (incoherent) behavioral theory of bundling and 
unbundling prices indicates yet another problem with the BLE theory of con-
sumer behavior in general and consumer response to surcharging in particular.  
For example, in a recent and lengthy blog post on the Expressions Hair Design 
case, Professor Jane Bambauer (one of the signatories to the First Amendment 
Scholars Merits Amicus) invoked behavioral economics to support the Plain-
tiffs’ arguments by claiming, among other things, that an “unbundled” sur-
charge benefits consumers: 
The next way one might try to rationalize the anti-surcharge laws 
is to suppose that consumers are well-served by seeing one sticker price 
that reflects the most they will have to pay at the cash register.  Perhaps 
New York and the other states with surcharge bans are regulating the 
way costs are framed for consumers. . . . 
. . . .  
This theory cracks with just a little probing.  The anti-surcharge laws 
wind up censoring not just truthful information, but valuable infor-
mation: specifically, information that disaggregates the costs of the 
good or service from the costs of the credit card transaction.  This in-
formation tends to benefit consumers by making them more likely to 
avoid transaction costs than they would be if the higher price were nor-
malized and the consumer were offered a discount.  The behavioral eco-
nomics literature shows that the anti-surcharge laws have it backwards: 
they make consumers more likely to use a card, and thus to pay the 
higher price, in a dual pricing system.  As an amicus brief filed by be-
havioral economists explains, lab experiments confirm that consumers 
are more likely to avoid a surcharge than to seek a discount.  (This is 
entirely consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s loss aver-
sion work.)274 
Leaving aside the incorrect claim that “lab experiments confirm that con-
sumers are more likely to avoid a surcharge than to seek a discount” – is “in-
formation that disaggregates the costs of the goods or services from the costs 
of the credit card transaction” actually valuable to consumers?275 
 
 274. See Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, Free Speech Challenge to Credit Card Sur-
charge Laws, INFO/LAW (June 27, 2016), https://blogs.harvard.edu/in-
folaw/2016/06/27/free-speech-challenges-to-credit-card-surcharge-laws/. 
 275. It is not clear what lab experiments Bambauer has in mind that allegedly “con-
firm that consumers are more likely to avoid a surcharge than to seek a discount,” as 
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Bambauer provides no explanation as to why provision of this particular 
information about this particular cost would be valuable to consumers (alt-
hough, as we have discussed, it is potentially valuable to merchants).  Presum-
ably, consumers care only about the final cost of the products they buy, includ-
ing all add-on fees like surcharges.  Why would they care (why would it be 
“salient”?) how much of the price covers card processing as opposed to any 
other element of the merchant’s cost?  After all, why stop at the card-processing 
component of the price?  Is it valuable for consumers to know what part of a 
price is attributable to the seller’s cost of acquiring inputs rather than shipping?  
Or what part of a price is attributable to import duties rather than transportation 
costs?  Production versus marketing?  The imputed cost of free parking and 
wages for sales clerks or management?  The cost of website maintenance?  
There is no obvious reason why, of all of the potential costs of doing business 
that could be disclosed to consumers, this one – and this one alone – is deemed 
to be particularly useful.  Moreover, if consumers would actually find this in-
formation useful, that would suggest only that merchants should disclose the 
amount of the processing fees they incur, not that they should charge a higher 
price to those who use credit cards. 
And while Bambauer says that the right to impose a surcharge is justified 
by BLE, other behavioral analyses argue that engaging in two-part or parti-
tioned pricing will actually increase consumer confusion and lead them at 
times to pay more, not less, than they otherwise would.276 
Thus, for example, BE and BLE scholars criticize the complex pricing 
structure of credit cards on the basis that having multiple price points results in 
consumer confusion and consumer inattention to “shrouded fees” (hidden, add-
on charges).277  Similarly, Oren Bar-Gill claims that one reason subprime home 
 
the only lab experiment (itself actually only a survey and not a lab experiment) that has 
ever been done on that topic was the one described in the BE Scholars Merits Amicus, 
conducted several months after Bambauer’s blog post.  Id.; see BE Scholars Merits 
Amicus, supra note 24, at 1.  It seems that what she really means to say is that lab 
experiments purportedly demonstrate the general presence of an endowment effect bias, 
but, like other BLE scholars, she appears unconsciously to conflate the existence of the 
endowment effect with its supposed operation in the context of surcharging versus dis-
counting.  Unfortunately, this tendency of adherents of BE to conflate the findings of 
surveys and laboratory experiments with their speculative application to real-world 
contexts is seemingly endemic to the field – not to mention that the validity and pre-
dictability of the endowment effect is itself open to substantial question.  See, e.g., 
Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, 
the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for 
Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005). 
 276. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON CONSUMER 
DECISION MAKING 6–11 (2010), http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_re-
search/OFT1226.pdf [hereinafter OFT PRICE FRAMES STUDY]. 
 277. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence 
From Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. ECON. 111, 112 (2015); Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, 
Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 969 (2012). 
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mortgages spawned consumer confusion was because the mortgage terms dis-
aggregated closing costs into many different costs, rather than bundling them 
all together into a final price.278  Some BLE scholars argue that airlines’ use of 
baggage fees, ticket change fees, and other fees constitute “shrouded fees” that 
enable airlines to exploit consumers.279 
None of these theories is supported by empirical analysis, yet they all de-
rive from the same BLE claim that multi-part pricing is harmful to consumers 
because it increases consumer confusion, increases the potential for infor-
mation overload, and enables sellers to impose shrouded or non-salient fees in 
their pricing. 
Yet, in other circumstances, BLE scholars claim that consumers are made 
better off by multi-part pricing, supposedly because multi-part pricing in-
creases “price transparency” for consumers.  Thus, for example, Oren Bar-Gill 
has also argued that consumers are harmed by the fact that credit cards inher-
ently provide both transactional and credit services and that consumer welfare 
would improve if consumers were required to use separate products for trans-
actions (debit cards) and credit (a personal loan).280  At the same time, others 
have argued that the elimination of free checking by banks would improve con-
sumer welfare by unbundling their pricing structure and forcing consumers to 
purchase the various components of free checking separately, such as overdraft 
protection or debit card services.281 
As with other BLE theories, whether certain prices should be bundled or 
unbundled appears to be essentially in the eye of the beholder.  The only dis-
cernibly consistent thread, in fact, appears to be that whichever price structure 
actually predominates in the market is asserted to have been designed to exploit 
consumers.  As Bambauer’s argument illustrates, there is no coherent theory of 
 
 278. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mort-
gage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1116 (2009).  Oddly, Bar-Gill’s theory on 
this point rests on the notion that this practice of unbundling closing fees is unique to 
subprime mortgages when in fact it is also characteristic of prime mortgages.  See id. 
 279. See Sumit Agarwal et al., A Simple Framework for Estimating Consumer Ben-
efits from Regulating Hidden Fees, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S239, S247–S250 (2014).  But 
see Geoffrey A. Manne & Todd J. Zywicki, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Behav-
ioral Economic Theory, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 555, 573–76 (2014) (discussing heter-
ogeneity in airline policies regarding baggage and other fees and explaining observed 
behavior as the result of seller price discrimination, not exploitation of consumer bi-
ases). 
 280. See Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
33, 48–51 (2006). 
 281. See Arin H. Smith, Note, Durbin’s Defect: The Impact of Post-Recession Leg-
islation on Low-Income Consumers, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 379 (2014) (“In theory, 
higher up-front fees could be mitigated by other benefits.  For example, Senator Durbin 
stated that one purpose of the Amendment was to increase transparency in the financial 
services market, thus empowering consumers to make good financial choices.  The idea 
is that even if banks are forced to raise fees to offset lost revenue on interchange fees, 
at least the true cost of the cards will be visible to consumers, rather than hidden within 
retail prices.” (footnote omitted)). 
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when price transparency provides valuable information on the one hand or sad-
dles consumers with information overload and shrouded-fee pricing on the 
other.282  In fact, a BLE theorist could easily construct a theory as to why mer-
chant surcharging harms consumers by causing confusion and inattention to 
shrouded fees, as the United Kingdom’s OFT has in fact already done.283  What 
is the generalizable theory of BLE, for example, that says it is efficient for mer-
chants to unbundle the cost of goods from the cost of the payment transaction, 
yet it is inefficient to unbundle closing costs in a mortgage contract?  Although 
each of these examples seems conceptually equivalent to the other and should 
be expected to trigger the same psychological quirk (if any), BLE theorists 
nevertheless maintain, without explaining the contradiction, that they operate 
differently. 
In jurisdictions that permit credit-card surcharging, merchants that dis-
close any surcharge as part of their advertised price (e.g., “credit price: $10.30” 
or, as in the Supreme Court’s examples, “‘$10, with a 3% credit card surcharge’ 
or ‘$10, plus $0.30 for credit’”),284 whether or not they discount from that price 
for cash transactions, are placed at a disadvantage relative to merchants that do 
not.285  These merchants would be free to advertise simply “$10,” thus appear-
ing to undercut the disclosing merchants’ price, even if the actual price they 
charge for credit or debit purchases were $10.30.  Such a dynamic impairs their 
incentive and ability to accurately inform potential customers of the full price 
of their products. 
Jurisdictions that permit only cash discounting, by contrast, do not have 
this dynamic.  There, an advertised price is the maximum price that a customer 
will have to pay, and a merchant has strong incentives to publicize available 
discounts as a way to entice customers to shop at the store.286  And, in contexts 
where most purchases are via credit card (such as online, or for big-ticket items 
like hotels and airline tickets), the advertised price will be the real price for the 
vast majority of consumers.  Further, to the extent that the advertised price 
differs from the price for paying in cash, the difference in price redounds to the 
customer’s benefit.287 
Real-world experience confirms that credit-card surcharges can effec-
tively conceal, rather than convey, information.  As Jean Tirole and his col-
leagues have observed, a nearly ubiquitous feature of “international experi-
ences with surcharging” is that “card surcharges are only announced at the 
point of sale, after consumers [have] incurred significant shopping costs.”288  
 
 282. See Bambauer, supra note 274. 
 283. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 31–43. 
 284. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1149 (2017). 
 285. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 28 n.25. 
 286. See Brief for Respondent Eric T. Schneiderman at 50–51, Expressions Hair 
Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391). 
 287. See id. 
 288. Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 19; see also LEE, MANNE, 
MORRIS & ZYWICKI, supra note 79, at 20–22. 
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And the British government has documented this phenomenon in online shop-
ping, where surcharges are often disclosed only at the final screen of the check-
out process.289  Moreover, at least two studies of foreign jurisdictions have 
found that consumers often learn of surcharges only after a transaction has 
gone through or – even worse – do not recall being notified of the surcharge 
at all.290 
It is true, as proponents argue, that “states must ‘assume that [accurate 
pricing] information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own 
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to 
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close 
them.’”291  But the “information” disclosed by surcharges is not particularly 
informative, or necessarily “truthful,” at all. 
As noted above, merchants are not constrained in any way to impose a 
surcharge amount that corresponds to the merchant’s cost of accepting credit 
cards.  Rather, they may use credit-card surcharges to extract additional profits 
by increasing surcharge rates beyond their costs of accepting credit cards, even 
though the term “credit-card surcharge” implies that the amount of the extra 
fee is no more than what the merchant itself is charged.292  Rather than convey-
ing information about the merchants’ costs (and it is unclear why consumers 
would care about these particular costs at all given the multitude of costs that 
are bundled into a price), surcharges do not necessarily convey anything about 
underlying prices; rather they convey (at most) the merchant’s revenue max-
imizing price given its ability to price discriminate. 
Moreover, because the merchant claims the excessive fee is a “credit-card 
surcharge,” the customer will often incorrectly believe that the additional fees 
are commensurate with the merchant’s cost and that they are the fault of the 
credit card company, not the merchant – i.e., that the merchant is just “passing 
it on.”  And, as real-world experience confirms,293 many customers will simply 
pay the excessive surcharge because they have no viable alternative to paying 
with a credit card by the time they learn of the surcharge. 
B. Regulation of Information Disclosure 
Regulators are not indifferent between discounts and surcharging for an-
other reason: Permitting surcharging requires the construction and enforcement 
 
 289. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 35–36 (observing 
that businesses often do not inform customers of a surcharge until the customer has 
“gone through four to six web pages, where numerous decisions have to be made to 
tailor the product and where personal information often has to be provided”). 
 290. VIS & TOTH, supra note 120, at 8 (stating that some of the companies that 
surcharge do not inform their customers); CHOICE, supra note 226, at 14. 
 291. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 32–33 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976)). 
 292. See Bolt, Jonker & van Renselaar, supra note 153, at 1739. 
 293. See discussion at supra notes 249–55. 
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of an extensive disclosure regime, whereas permitting discounting does not.  
As noted above, because surcharging seems to be motivated by a desire by 
some merchants to extract surplus through holding up consumers at the point 
of sale, merchants have a strong incentive to minimize the transparency of their 
surcharges and to reveal surcharges to consumers as late in the shopping expe-
rience as possible – typically well after a consumer has invested her time in 
shopping in the store and deciding on a purchase.  Doing so minimizes the 
likelihood that a consumer confronted with a surcharge will simply walk away 
from the transaction.  Disclosure of cash discounting, by contrast, will tend to 
be self-enforcing: Because discounting is a price reduction to the consumer, 
the merchant will have a strong incentive to promote it to the consumer early 
and often, thereby eliminating the need for a complicated disclosure regime 
that could entail significant enforcement costs. 
In fact, as suggested above, countries that have allowed surcharging have 
experienced chronic problems as a result of the lack of transparency by mer-
chants in disclosing their proposed surcharges to consumers.  In the United 
Kingdom, for example, OFT revealed that transportation passengers on air-
lines, ferries, and trains had to click through an average of six pages – and in 
some cases eight pages – before a surcharge was revealed.294 
Where surcharging is permitted, consumers have expressed widespread 
frustration with respect to the disclosure of surcharging.  As an American Ex-
press spokesperson in Australia stated in the Choice Report, “The number-one 
complaint we hear from consumers is that they didn’t know there was a sur-
charge until it was too late.”295  Twelve percent of respondents in the report 
stated that they did not recall being notified of the presence of a surcharge at 
all.296  Of those who were notified, 25.7% felt that the method of notification 
was not prominent enough, and 17.4% said that the timing of the notification 
was inadequate (including in some instances disclosure only after the transac-
tion had gone through).297  Although these disclosure problems appear to affect 
only a minority of consumers, the number of people affected is also not zero – 
again, providing a contrast to cash discounting, for which a merchant has pow-
erful incentives to make shoppers fully aware of the discount and for which 
lack of disclosure is unlikely to be a problem.298  Thus, like the self-limiting 
nature of the size of cash discounts that mitigates the need for the state to police 
 
 294. OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 36 tbl.6.1. 
 295. See CHOICE, supra note 226, at 14 (statement of Luisa Megale, American Ex-
press Spokesperson). 
 296. Id.  This figure is consistent with that reported by Vis and Toth that some of 
the merchants that they surveyed do not tell their customers of the surcharge.  See VIS 
& TOTH, supra note 120, at 8 (reporting that eighty-nine percent of merchants surveyed 
that surcharge tell their customers that they do so). 
 297. See CHOICE, supra note 226, at 14.  And in other instances, consumers reported 
that the disclosure was made verbally and only at the point that the transaction was 
actually being processed.  Id. at 15. 
 298. Of course, even this assessment leaves aside the fact that around twelve per-
cent of shoppers claim that they never knew of the surcharge at all.  Id. at 14. 
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opportunism, cash discounts also appear to have a natural bias toward greater 
transparency. 
In addition, solving the problem of adequate surcharge disclosure is more 
difficult than it might seem at first glance.  In the United States, for example, 
there are literally thousands of different debit, credit, and prepaid cards, with a 
wide range of different interchange fees and other costs.  Few would think it 
adequate for a merchant to simply put a sign in the window or on a webpage 
stating that they reserve the right to impose a surcharge, with no further infor-
mation, only to finally reveal the size of the surcharge at the time of checkout. 
But if a mere notice that surcharging may occur is inadequate, what would 
be required to accurately disclose the surcharge?  Might the merchant simply 
impose a surcharge based on the average cost differential between all payment 
cards and cash?  If so, then this by definition means that half of consumers will 
be paying a surcharge fee that exceeds the cost to the merchant.  It is hard to 
see how authorizing merchants to impose above-cost surcharges on low-fee 
cards but below-cost surcharges on higher-fee premiere cards benefits consum-
ers.  Alternatively, should merchants be allowed to disclose an average sur-
charge rate at first and then impose a higher fee on some consumers at the 
register?  This hardly seems an equitable practice and still entails the same bait-
and-switch tactics we have previously discussed. 
The United States can learn from the problems experienced in other coun-
tries on this point.  For example, Australian regulators have long been critical 
of the practice of “blended” surcharging – namely, imposing a single uniform 
surcharge amount, perhaps even one based on the merchant’s overall average 
cost of acceptance.299  As the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) wrote in its 
latest round of revisions to its surcharging rules in order to address the problem 
of abusive surcharging practices by merchants: “Where a merchant applies a 
single surcharge across two systems with different acceptance costs and sets 
the surcharge at the average acceptance cost of the two, the lower-cost system 
will be surcharged excessively (i.e., above its acceptance costs).  This dulls 
price signals and does not support efficient payment choices.”300  And while 
the RBA recognized that this practice of blended surcharging often arises from 
the merchant’s desire to avoid keeping track of and processing a myriad of 
different acceptance costs, the RBA still required merchants to set surcharge 
fees at no more than the lowest acceptance-cost rate among the various card 
networks that they accept.301 
Enabling merchants to surcharge opens substantial problems of infor-
mation provision and disclosure that are much more difficult than advocates of 
the practice have been willing to consider.  Moreover, in many cases, the in-
formation asymmetry inherent in such a disclosure regime will overwhelm-
ingly tilt in the merchants’ favor, possibly resulting in a reduction of consumer 
welfare. 
 
 299. Id. at 15. 
 300. RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., supra note 227, at 33. 
 301. Id. 
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VII. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS VS. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: 
CONFLICTING BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATIONS FOR AND AGAINST 
SURCHARGING 
The BLE theory of surcharging also confronts a substantial and more gen-
eral problem inherent in BE’s effort to apply various biases identified in labor-
atory experiments to the real world.  In many situations, various alleged behav-
ioral biases often contradict one another or have offsetting effects when applied 
in particular circumstances.  Although the reality of this problem is frequently 
acknowledged, it is also often paid merely lip-service.  Yet, the problem is far 
too severe to be left unaddressed, both in general but also specifically with 
respect to the effort to apply behavioral economics to predict consumer re-
sponses to surcharging and assess whether permitting surcharging will increase 
consumer welfare. 
Consider the seemingly simple example of the claim that people system-
atically fail to save enough for retirement.  BLE theorists speculate that this 
tendency arises from purported biases that lead people either to underestimate 
how much they need to save for retirement or to lack sufficient self-control to 
carry through with their desired plans.302  Yet, behavioral economists also con-
tend that people suffer from “over-optimism” bias, which supposedly leads 
them to systematically overestimate their likelihood of living to retirement age, 
such as by underestimating the likelihood of contracting a fatal disease or dying 
in an accident.303  Nor do they have any methodology for determining the 
strength of these offsetting biases and whether they lead people, on average, to 
save too much, too little, or just the right amount for retirement.  In fact, BLE 
can be invoked to “explain” any of these behaviors.304 
These examples highlight the “just-so stories” problem of BLE method-
ology.305  The existence of dozens of purported biases with potentially offset-
ting effects and the absence of a systematic means of reconciling them means 
that it is possible to explain virtually any consumer behavior – as well as its 
opposite – by reference to these biases and to claim that either is suboptimal.  
But a theory that can explain anything is a theory that can predict nothing. 
 
 302. See generally Zywicki, supra note 65 (providing an empirical assessment of 
the claim that Americans under-save for retirement and concluding that there is little 
reason to believe that Americans would be better off if nudged to save more). 
 303. See id. at 911 n.126; see, e.g., Justin Kruger & Jeremy Burrus, Egocentrism 
and Focalism in Unrealistic Optimism (and Pessimism), 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 332, 332 (2004). 
 304. See Zywicki, supra note 65, at 885. 
 305. See Zywicki, Just-So Stories, supra note 68, at 188. 
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A. The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading Applies Behav-
ioral Economics to the Same Issue... and Reaches Precisely the Oppo-
site Conclusion 
Thus, while there are behavioral theories that purport to provide a justifi-
cation for allowing merchants to surcharge, unsurprisingly, there are also the-
ories – well summarized by the OFT in a recent report306 – that explain how 
allowing surcharging can harm consumers by enabling merchants to prey on 
consumer biases.  Many of the same biases that American BLE theorists point 
to as justifying a right to surcharge are precisely the same biases that the OFT 
points to as leading to potential consumer harm from surcharging, such as 
framing, loss aversion, and prospect theory.307  This inconsistency aptly illus-
trates the problem of reliance on BE for policy recommendations.  The fact that 
two different sets of experts can analyze the exact same issue using the exact 
same set of purported biases and reach diametrically opposed conclusions sug-
gests the weakness of the foundation of behavioral-based consumer financial 
protection policy in this context. 
The OFT contends that the consumer bias phenomenon explains the ubiq-
uitous tendency of merchants to withhold information from a consumer as long 
as possible into the shopping and purchasing process, such as by requiring mul-
tiple screens when making an online purchase or by withholding details about 
the size and specifics of surcharges for retail store purchases.308  It refers to the 
practice of disclosing one price at first (the posted price of goods on a shelf) 
and then raising the price later by imposing a surcharge as “drip pricing,” in 
that the full price is not stated upfront but rather emerges in multiple stages.309 
According to the OFT, “by revealing prices at a late stage of the transac-
tion process and separating them from the headline price a number of behav-
ioural biases are engaged which also make consumers less willing to shop 
around for the best price and more likely to underestimate the total price 
paid.”310 
For example, consumers supposedly suffer from a “commitment and con-
sistency” bias, which means that “people have a desire to be consistent with 
their previous actions.”311  Thus, “even when the price starts to increase [such  
 306. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ADVERTISING OF PRICES 16 (2010), 
http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-stud-
ies/AoP/OFT1291.pdf [hereinafter UK ADVERTISING STUDY]; see also GORKAN 
AHMETOGLU ET AL., PRICING PRACTICES: THEIR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
AND WELFARE 20 (2010), http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaf-
lets/659703/Advertising-of-prices/Pricing-Practices.pdf. 
 307. See UK ADVERTISING STUDY, supra note 306 passim.  
 308. See OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 5. 
 309. UK ADVERTISING STUDY, supra note 306, at 5. 
 310. OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 32 (emphasis added). 
 311. Id. 
67
Zywicki et al.: Behavioral Economics Goes to Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
836 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
as by imposing a surcharge] they tend to remain committed to the retailer.”312  
Consumers are also said to suffer from an “endowment effect and loss aver-
sion” bias, which means that “people seem to value a product more once they 
own or feel like they own it, such that they demand more to give up an object 
than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.”313  Thus, “[a]s consumers go 
through the transaction process, their feelings of ownership increase and there-
fore so too does their willingness to pay.”314  Consequently, once consumers 
feel this ownership interest, they are more vulnerable to merchants holding 
them up late in the purchase process by imposing a surcharge in addition to the 
marked price.315 
The “endowment effect” bias to which the OFT points as making con-
sumers vulnerable to opportunism in the context of drip pricing (i.e., surcharg-
ing) is exactly the same bias to which American behavioral law and economics 
scholars point as increasing consumer welfare in the same context: 
 
 For the OFT, when shoppers arrive at the point of payment with a 
bundle of goods in tow (and money in their wallets and bank ac-
counts), the endowment effect induces them to pay more than they 
would otherwise (i.e., to accept the surcharge) in order to complete 
their transaction – in order to keep “their” goods.316  They would suf-
fer no such harm if the merchant offered a cash discount; rather, they 
would both keep “their” goods and save money by anticipating the 
lower price from the start. 
 
 For the American BLE scholars, when shoppers arrive at the point of 
payment with money in their wallets and bank accounts (and goods 
in tow), the endowment effect induces them to opt for the lower-cost 
payment method (i.e., to reject the surcharge) in order to keep more 
of their money.  They would perceive no such benefit if the merchant 
offered a cash discount; rather, they would view the discount as a 
“gift” of someone else’s money, instead of a way to keep what was 
already theirs and, according to BLE theory, more readily reject it.317 
 
In other words, the concept appears to be so elastic and ill-defined that 
exactly the same bias, in exactly the same circumstance, can be relied upon to 
justify squarely contradictory conclusions.  It is hard to see how theories that 
 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. It is worth pointing out that the “loss aversion” bias is, of course, also the one 
that behavioral economists point to as supposedly supporting the need to allow sur-
charging.  See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 128 passim.  
 316. OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 32. 
 317. See BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18, at 8. 
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purport to explain directly contradictory results can provide a useful foundation 
for law or public policy. 
The OFT also points to the framing effect to explain why surcharging 
harms, rather than helps, consumers – also in contrast to the American BLE 
scholars: 
Subjects reported in the questionnaire feeling disappointed in this 
frame because they felt they were receiving a good deal when they saw 
the base price.  Subjects reported that they still bought the good after 
they found out the additional charges, but felt cheated and annoyed be-
cause their pay-off was reduced.318 
And the “anchoring bias” comes into play in contradictory fashion, as 
well.  As the OFT agues: 
Drip pricing was also found to increase sales as consumers focus (or 
‘anchor’) on the piece of information they consider to be most im-
portant, often the advertised price, and do not fully adjust their calcula-
tion of the total price, as additional charges are revealed, thereby over-
estimating their total value of the deal.  The lower up-front price there-
fore attracts consumers and the first shop (or website) that they visit 
benefits from higher sales, as some consumers choose not to shop 
around even when additional charges are revealed.319 
The OFT also refers to the “behavioural psychology literature” that shows 
that “simply separating a price into a base price and additional charge, even 
where they are displayed together, known as ‘partitioned pricing,’ leads to 
higher demand and perceived value amongst consumers, as well as a lower 
recalled price, lower estimation and lower search (shopping around) inten-
tions.”320  All of these biases contribute to the implication that surcharging 
might be harmful to consumers because it exploits consumer biases. 
Notably, the OFT found that consumers in its experiment were not de-
terred by a surcharge – that they still paid with a credit card despite the sur-
charge.  But as a result, consumers “felt cheated and annoyed.”321  This finding 
– that consumers are annoyed at how surcharges are assessed in practice but 
nevertheless still use cards because of limited alternatives – could explain how 
Vis & Toth’s study of Dutch consumers could simultaneously find high rates 
of feelings of annoyance with surcharges but nevertheless low rates of diver-
sion to alternative payment devices. 
By contrast, on the American side of the Atlantic, the BE Scholars Merits 
Amicus (as well as the merchant plaintiffs) simply infers that, because con-
sumers are annoyed by surcharges in the Dutch Study, surcharges are therefore 
 
 318. OFT PRICE FRAMES STUDY, supra note 276, at 9 (emphasis added). 
 319. OFT PAYMENT SURCHARGES STUDY, supra note 40, at 33. 
 320. Id. 
 321. OFT PRICE FRAMES STUDY, supra note 276, at 9. 
69
Zywicki et al.: Behavioral Economics Goes to Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
838 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
more effective.  Moreover, these scholars concoct their own just-so story to 
explain why surcharges are more effective – even though that same study sug-
gested that feelings of annoyance do not translate into fewer surcharged trans-
actions.322 
In fact, the OFT experiment found that drip pricing resulted in, by far, the 
largest welfare loss for consumers of any of the pricing strategies studied.323  It 
also found that drip pricing resulted in “substantially” more errors by consum-
ers in finding the lowest price of any of the pricing strategies that were exam-
ined.324 
Thus, according to the OFT, a variety of behavioral biases – loss aversion, 
anchoring, the commitment and consistency principle – suggest that the reason 
that merchants demand a right to surcharge is actually in order to exploit con-
sumer biases.  And, crucially, this explanation works only if merchants believe 
that surcharges will not cause a substantial number of consumers to leave the 
store or avoid using a card.  Indeed, consistent with the hypothesis of Lee, 
Manne, Morris, and Zywicki325 and Bourguignon, Gomes, and Tirole326 that 
surcharging appears to operate in practice as a rent-extraction device rather 
than a mechanism to divert consumers to alternative payment devices, it seems 
that the reason why merchants prefer to surcharge instead of discount is pre-
cisely because consumers will not switch to cash, not because they do. 
We hasten to add that this discussion should not be read to endorse the 
OFT’s analysis, either, as its analysis is as speculative and context-dependent 
as the American BLE scholars’ theories invoked in favor of allowing surcharg-
ing.  The OFT’s analysis, however, at least has the virtue of being consistent 
with the empirical evidence that exists, which suggests that surcharging actu-
ally may be less effective than cash discounting at diverting consumers to al-
ternative payment devices. 
More generally, however, the reality that behavioral economics can pro-
vide “just-so story” arguments both for and against surcharging raises ques-
tions about the predictive accuracy of the methodology.  This inconsistency 
aptly illustrates the problem of reliance on BE for policy recommendations and 
highlights the risks of basing constitutional doctrine on such speculative meth-
odology and dubious empirical foundations.327 
 
 322. See BE Scholars Merits Amicus, supra note 24, at 2–3. 
 323. OFT PRICE FRAMES STUDY, supra note 276, at 8. 
 324. See id. at 87 tbl.5.19, 56 tbl.5.1 (reporting that drip pricing resulted in much 
larger welfare loss for consumers than any of the “price frames” that were tested). 
 325. See LEE, MANNE, MORRIS & ZYWICKI, supra note 79, at 27. 
 326. See Bourguignon, Gomes & Tirole, supra note 38, at 22. 
 327. See, e.g., Klass & Zeiler, supra note 178. 
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B. Other Behavioral Biases Also Support – Rather Than Refute – 
Surcharge Bans 
These examples provide only a small glimpse into the real difficulty of 
implementing policies on the basis of behavioral economics claims. 
Consider, for example, the trendy BLE notion of “shrouded pricing,” an 
argument that dates to a 2006 article by Gabaix and Laibson328 and which has 
recently been embraced by BLE scholars in the context of credit card pricing.329  
The theory of “shrouded pricing” divides seller pricing behavior into two cat-
egories of terms: “salient” terms – those that consumers presumably notice and 
consider in their purchasing decisions – and “non-salient” terms – those that 
consumers do not pay attention to.330 
To illustrate the idea, it has been argued that certain behavior-based fees 
on credit cards, such as late fees and over-the-limit fees, are non-salient to the 
consumer shopping decision.331  Thus, it is implied, credit card issuers can ex-
tract rents from consumers by using those terms instead of alternate revenue 
sources that may more effectively deter consumers from adopting or using 
cards.  Although this hypothesis has been falsified in the credit card context,332 
it nevertheless remains a staple of BLE theory. 
A fundamental problem with the theory, however, is its lack of rigor in 
classifying terms as “salient” or “non-salient.”  Most notoriously, one leading 
BLE consumer credit scholar rested the core claim of a 2004 article on the 
assertion that credit card interest rates were non-salient to consumers,333 only 
to completely reverse himself in another article approximately a decade 
later.334  This switch in position came with little discussion other than a terse 
claim, provided with no theory or empirical support, that interest rates simply 
became salient to consumers.335 
Similarly, some BLE scholars assert that fees charged for consumer cash 
advances on credit cards are non-salient, although it is difficult to see why those 
fees would not be salient at the time consumers take the advance.336  Moreover, 
BLE scholars routinely make sweeping claims based on the theory of 
“shrouded costs” without any consideration of alternative hypotheses or even 
 
 328. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, 
and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006). 
 329. See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 277, at 1002. 
 330. Id. at 971–72. 
 331. See id. at 974. 
 332. See discussion in Durkin, Elliehausen & Zywicki, supra note 61, at 46–52. 
 333. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1378, 1407 
(2004) (arguing that long-term interest rates are “non-salient”). 
 334. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 95 (2012) (arguing that long-term interest rates 
are “salient”). 
 335. See discussion in Durkin, Elliehausen & Zywicki, supra note 61, at 46–52. 
 336. See id. 
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casual empirical observation that rebuts the claim.337  The problem is that such 
concepts are non-falsifiable, malleable, self-contradictory, and, often, trotted 
out only when convenient. 
Thus, although it would seem wholly appropriate to do so, BLE scholars 
have not described credit card surcharges as shrouded fees – presumably be-
cause, as it is currently interpreted, the theory of shrouded fees does not offer 
the desired result.  In the context of surcharging, the theory would seem to 
suggest that surcharging may be a shrouded fee, as a surcharge is an additional 
charge that is imposed on top of the base charge for the product being pur-
chased, often (as some of the evidence indicates) without the consumer’s 
awareness.  Moreover, the theory would also predict that surcharges would be 
relatively ineffective at changing consumer behavior at checkout, which would 
in turn predict that surcharging would be relatively ineffective at altering be-
havior.  And yet (or, more likely, as a result), despite the apparent relevance of 
the shrouded fees concept to the practice of merchant surcharging, neither BLE 
scholars nor the merchants citing them make reference to shrouded fees in their 
analyses.338  This lapse aptly illustrates the problem of reliance on BE for pol-
icy recommendations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The BLE arguments underlying the challenges to state anti-surcharging 
laws in cases like Expressions Hair Design are based on weak economic theory 
and even weaker – indeed, incorrect – empirical evidence.  Whatever the ulti-
mate legal merits of the First Amendment arguments adduced to challenge 
these laws, to the extent that they rest on the BLE arguments advanced by the 
merchants (and partially recognized by the lower courts), they are woefully 
lacking. 
The effort to interject behavioral economics into these cases points to a 
larger issue, however: the still-undeveloped nature of BLE (and BE, for that 
matter) as a research program and the dangers of basing law and policy on such 
an unstable foundation. 
The issue of surcharging versus discounting illuminates the problems in 
dramatic fashion.  The entire argument for the purportedly greater efficacy of 
surcharging versus discounting as a means of changing consumer demand for 
certain payment mechanisms rests on only a small handful of self-referential 
papers peddling dubious theory and unsupported speculation.339  Subsequent 
papers claimed to provide further support have largely just uncritically cited to 
these original articles, without adding any new or useful empirical evidence.  
And, to the extent that empirical evidence does exist, it is weak and inconsistent 
 
 337. See Manne & Zywicki, supra note 279, at 573–76. 
 338. See generally BLE Scholars Cert. Amicus, supra note 18. 
 339. See supra Analysis of the Behavioral Law & Economics Claims on Discount-
ing and Surcharges. 
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with the hypotheses, anyway.  Moreover, the evidence, such as it is, is selec-
tively referenced and consistently mischaracterized.340 
Still further, on this issue and many others, BLE, and the BE literature 
underlying it, is frequently self-contradictory and riddled with non-falsifiable 
“just-so” stories that make no effort to consider or test alternative hypotheses.  
With respect to surcharging, Lee, Manne, Morris, and Zywicki and, later, No-
bel laureate Jean Tirole, have argued that the best explanation for observed 
surcharging behavior in practice is price discrimination based on consumers’ 
access to alternative payment mechanisms at the time of payment.341  Thus, for 
example, surcharging is most prevalent not where card payment costs are 
higher; rather, the tendency to surcharge bears no relationship at all to under-
lying cost but is more prevalent in markets where it is difficult to use alternative 
payment devices, such as online shopping, airline tickets, or travel. 
Put simply, BLE offers a seemingly logical theory to oppose bans on sur-
charging – but it fails to comport with the evidence, fails to explain why sur-
charging occurs more commonly in some markets than others, and fails to ex-
plain the abusive surcharging behaviors that have characterized markets around 
the world where surcharging has been permitted. 
Where, as here, these limitations impair the reliability of BLE arguments, 
courts and policymakers should be hesitant to rely on them in deciding cases 
or enacting laws and regulations.  Although the Supreme Court did not explic-
itly address the BLE claims when it considered the Expressions Hair Design 
case,342 they are likely to arise again on remand.  Regardless of the ultimate 
outcome it reaches, the Second Circuit should affirmatively reject the BLE ba-
ses for the merchants’ arguments in the case. 
  
 
 340. See supra Analysis of the Behavioral Law & Economics Claims on Discount-
ing and Surcharges. 
 341. See discussion supra notes 207–12. 
 342. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
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